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Preface
In the aftermath of much of the civil unrest related to race in the mid-to-late 20th Century,
racially motivated conflict has been relatively sparse. Between the Los Angeles riots following
the Rodney King trial and the riots in Ferguson following the murder of Michael Brown,
America entered what may be considered an unprecedented era for Black Americans. Black
America gained more mainstream traction than it had in prior eras, due partly to the wide reach
of cable television, music, and the Internet as vehicles to distribute Black cultural products to the
masses as well as a greater economic and cultural appreciation for the value of Black cultural
products. America’s Black middle class became more pronounced in society, with television
shows like The Fresh Prince of Bel-Air, The Cosby Show, and A Different World showcasing a
different vision of Black life than its predecessors (e.g., Good Times) towards the end of the 20th
Century. The changes in media depiction came alongside meaningful material change for Black
Americans. According to a 2018 report from the Economic Policy Institute, there have been
some notable improvements for younger African-Americans since 1968. Between the ages of 2529, more than 90 percent of African-Americans graduated high school compared to a little more
than half in 1968, nearly closing the racial high school graduation gap.1 9 percent of AfricanAmericans had a college degree in 1968; that has risen to 22.8 percent in 2016.2 Adjusted for
inflation, the hourly wage of the average Black worker increased 30.5% between 1968 and 2016,
helping to close the racial wage gap.3 A watershed moment of this era was the election of

1

Economic Policy Institute. “50 Years after the Kerner Commission.” February 26, 2018, pg. 2.
https://www.epi.org/publication/50-years-after-the-kerner-commission/
2
Ibid, 3
3
Ibid.
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President Barack Obama, which has been considered a confirming moment that America had
achieved a meaningful sense of its colorblind, post-racial ideal.4
And yet, the situation for Black America remains tenuous. As Ta-Nahesi Coates explains,
“The lives of black Americans are better than they were half a century ago… But such progress
rests on a shaky foundation, and fault lines are everywhere.”5 In particular, the notion of a postracial America has been challenged because of the ongoing presence of racial injustice. Many
incidents of racial injustice have been documented and become part of that day’s news cycle in
recent years, largely due to the expansive reach of smartphones and social media. Ranging from
police violence against Black Americans to the various forms of implicit and explicit racism that
Black Americans live with, recently documented with the hashtag #LivingWhileBlack, racial
injustice has continued to be a feature of American society.
My working definition of anti-Black injustice is racial injustice specifically committed
against Black people in America because they are Black. This is done to distinguish the specific
sort of injustice that has been either historically or contemporarily committed against Black
Americans from other racial, ethnic, and sociocultural groups. That this phenomenon has
persisted across generations establishes a normative framework regarding Black people in
America; that is, it creates a system of social, moral, and political norms for how Black people in
America should be treated. These norms have often adjusted to changes in American dynamics
across all levels of society. Chattel slavery was made illegal through constitutional amendments,
which led to changing norms that would continue to disempower, disenfranchise, and
discriminate against Black people through Jim Crow policies. Jim Crow and formal segregation
4
5

McWhorter, John "The End of Racism?" 5 November 2008. Forbes.com.
Coates, Ta-Nahesi. "The Case for Reparations." The Atlantic (June 2014): 54-71, p. 60.
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policies ended through civil rights legislation, but the rise of industrial prisons, school-to-prison
pipeline, and aggressive over-policing of Black people in America has birthed a new form of Jim
Crow. This set of legal and social policies uses criminalizing stereotypes of Black and Latinx
people, reifying them into groups of people that carry, as Michelle Alexander has convincingly
shown, the “mark of the felon,” a mark that is considered justification for stripping away their
rights as a citizen.6 In short, while there is no such thing as the Black experience in America,
nevertheless, the lived experience of Black Americans inevitably includes encounters with antiBlack injustice, either directly or indirectly. Black people across the African diaspora, including
Black Americans, inevitably experience anti-Black injustice. Addressing the diasporic nature of
anti-Black injustice would require more space and a wider scope than I envision for this project,
so my focus will be on the American context.
The Driving Question of this Project
Viewing the lived experiences of Black people in America as rife with anti-Black
injustice is one way of conceptually framing the Black experience – one with the potential to
resemble the “poor, nasty, brutish, and short” experience that Hobbes famously described of
peoples in the state of nature. This is not to say that Black Americans are not members of
American society. But they are people who live with the constant threat of having their rights
violated while being members of American society.7 This threat is marked at every turn by a
figurative specter that sits on the shoulders of all Black Americans, ever watchful for the face of
racism. Maybe it is in this event or that person, this song or that television show, this
philosophical discussion or that political campaign, and so on.
6

Alexander, Michelle. The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness. New York: New Press,
2010.
7
Lawson, Bill. “Locke and the Legal Obligations of Black Americans.” Public Affairs Quarterly 3.3 (1989): 49-63.
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That Black people in America have historically and do presently experience racial
injustice is not a controversial claim. But it prompts the further question of why these injustices
have persisted across much of the Black experience in America. One answer is that these
injustices have not been rectified. Rodney Roberts, for example, argues that Black Americans are
perceived by the dominant majority in America as not deserving of having their injustices
rectified, which ultimately constrains their ability to receive rectification.8 In making this claim,
Roberts is suggesting that how Black Americans are socially recognized ultimately affects their
ability to gain rectification. Roberts’ position is helpful for two reasons: it maps onto recent
surveys regarding white opposition to reparations to the descendants of African slaves and Jim
Crow policies;9 and Roberts’ point about the importance of perception correlates with the
concept of social recognition. In other words, Roberts illuminates a connection between social
recognition and rectification. This connection is the driving issue of my dissertation. My
fundamental question is this: what tool of moral and political philosophy can be deployed to
better understand the connection between rectifying anti-Black injustice and how Black
Americans are socially recognized? And my answer is moral rights.
Thinking about the connection between rectification and social recognition within the
framework of moral rights is a necessary response to the philosophical literature about Black
reparations, as many of the existing philosophical arguments regarding rectifying those injustices
turn on the use of moral rights either implicitly or explicitly. These arguments, while useful for
justifying claims for Black reparations, leave us with a puzzle: if claims for Black reparations are
justified, what is inhibiting the ability of Black Americans to gain reparations? My position is

8

Roberts, Rodney. "Why Have the Injustices Perpetrated Against Blacks in America Not Been Rectified?" Journal of
Social Philosophy 32.3 (2001): 357-373.
9
Moore, Peter. "Overwhelming Opposition to Reparations for Slavery and Jim Crow." 2 June 2014. YouGov.com.
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that having the right justification is necessary but not sufficient for possessing a moral right to
rectification. On my view, there is another process that conditions how we come to possess
moral rights – social recognition.
If moral rights possession requires a certain kind of social recognition, then any right to
rectification that Black Americans claim to possess also requires a certain kind of social
recognition. More exactly, I will argue that how Black Americans are socially recognized has
negatively impacted their ability to possess or exercise a right to rectification, a right they
otherwise should have based on the anti-Black injustice they have experienced.
To be clear, my position is not that Black Americans cannot possess this right, for I argue
that Black Americans have a moral justification for possessing a right to rectification. Instead, I
am claiming that possessing and ultimately exercising this right requires more than having moral
justification – it requires being socially recognized in a certain sort of way, such that the morally
justified demands for justice become a social reality. In short, the rights that subjects have exist
when a subject can claim them and use them. This approach strengthens the Black reparations
debate for two reasons: it reframes the Black reparations discussion by focusing on what is
needed to possess and exercise a right to rectification rather than arguing about the morality that
justifies claims for reparations; and its pragmatic framework requires identifying various kinds of
societal changes needed for Black Americans to exercise a right to rectification. Finally, my
argument also has the potential to illuminate the mistreatment of other marginalized
communities.
In Chapter 1, I provide a theory of justice, rectificatory justice, that incorporates Black
reparations claims as one necessary aspect to rectifying injustice and endorse an alternative
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theory of moral rights possession, as well as why it is preferable to a traditional view of moral
rights possession for addressing moral rights possession for marginalized groups. In Chapter 2, I
apply that alternative theory of moral rights possession, institutional rights externalism, to the
American context to show how social recognition plays a significant role in moral rights
possession for Black Americans. In Chapter 3, I settle three theoretical issues with the alternative
theory – the pragmatic principles that it adheres to, its assumption of the importance of social
recognition for people or groups, and offer an account of how to understand a rights violation by
an institution – and apply the theory to generate an analysis of why Black Americans have not
received rectificatory justice. In Chapter 4, I argue that my position is incompatible to two
counterclaims within the Black community to claims of rectificatory justice – that Black
Americans have already received rectificatory justice through civil rights legislation, and that
contemporary Black Americans do not deserve the right to rectification. In Chapter 5, I argue
that Black Americans could potentially come to possess the right to rectification because how
they are socially recognized is not fixed, and I offer concrete steps to engineer that change.
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Abstract
Within academic circles, arguments supporting the rectification of anti-Black injustice in
America have become more widespread in recent years. Three questions arise from these
arguments: How should we understand what it means to rectify those injustices? What explains
why these arguments, despite the increased attention by scholars, have not been taken seriously
in mainstream American social and political discussions? Finally, what can be done to change
this lack of mainstream attention? My dissertation answers these questions by advancing a new
moral framework for understanding what it means to rectify anti-black injustice. On this view,
rectificatory justice requires possessing a moral right to rectification, a right that Black
Americans would have if moral rights possession was based solely on making morally justified
demands. Possessing and ultimately exercising moral rights requires more than having moral
justification – it requires being socially recognized in a certain sort of way, such that morally
justified demands become a social reality. Correspondingly, even though Black Americans are
making morally justified demands, they do not yet possess a moral right to rectification because
of how they are socially recognized. This constrains the social and political potential of
arguments supporting rectificatory measures, like reparations. Some have argued that Black
Americans have already gained rectificatory justice through anti-discrimination legislation and
programs like affirmative action. Although they appear to be rectificatory, they do not meet the
standards of rectificatory justice because they do not take responsibility for creating the
conditions of injustice, preferring to focus on preventing future versions of similar forms of
injustice. Since Black Americans have not received rectificatory justice but are making morally
justified demands, what is required for them to possess a right to rectification is a change in how
they are socially recognized. By amending the cultural narrative regarding anti-Black injustice as
an enduring phenomenon rather than a historic one, and endeavoring to produce a sense of
xiii

justice within mainstream America regarding anti-Black injustice, it may be possible to change
how Black Americans are socially recognized such that they possess a right to rectification.
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Chapter 1: Anti-Black Injustice, Rectificatory Justice and Institutional
Rights Externalism
Introduction
My goal in this chapter is to suggest a viable alternative about the nature of moral rights
possession. In particular, this alternative explicitly ties the process of moral rights possession
with social recognition. This is a significant departure from a traditional view of moral rights
possession, one where moral rights exist based on the kind of being that one is. I defend my
position in three steps. First, I endorse a theory of rectification, rectificatory justice, to provide a
broader theoretical context for reparations claims. Second, I offer evidence of anti-Black
injustice that demands rectificatory justice. I will then suggest an alternative theory of moral
rights possession, institutional rights externalism.

Section 1: Rectificatory Justice and Black Reparations

Rectificatory justice has a long history. Its conceptual origins lie with Aristotle in the
Nicomachean Ethics, as Aristotle recognized that justice came in two forms: what is lawful and
what is fair. Fairness, for Aristotle, means equality. He considered fairness as a justification for
rectification in scenarios where there exists an inequality that resulted from the actions of
another.1 Centuries later, within the liberal tradition, the idea that rectification is due to the
victims of injustice has roots in Locke’s Second Treatise. Locke agrees with Hobbes that all
people are equal in the state of nature. Locke’s reasoning differs from Hobbes, as Locke argues
1

See Aristotle, “Nicomachean Ethics,” The Complete Works of Aristotle Volume Two. Ed. Jonathan Barnes.
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995. 1729-1867. 5.1, 1129b1; 5.3 1131a10-1131a13; 5.4, 1132a7. Aristotle
also considers rectificatory justice as the intermediate between loss and gain, noting that loss and gain exist
whenever suffering occurs (5.4, 1132a10-1132a15).
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for this equality because since people are creatures of the same species, born with the same
faculties and natural advantages.2 Concomitant with this equality, people are governed by
Reason, which delivers the laws of nature. Reason directs us never to encroach on another’s right
to life, liberty, or property because we are all equals as the products of a divine creator.3
Rectification is required to repair the damage done to people by transgressors, which he notes is
a frequent occurrence in situations where the law of Reason is broken.4 Pursuing rectification is
only possible for a person harmed by a transgressor but it is not necessarily the case that the only
person who can pursue rectificatory justice is the victim, as those who have also been harmed by
the actions of the transgressor (e.g., the child of a murder victim) is also owed rectification.5 For
Locke, the basis upon which claims of reparations and punishment can be made is someone
possessing a right to rectification. One possesses this right if and only if their rights have been
violated.
Now, flash forward to the present. Rodney Roberts begins from a similar liberal
democratic tradition to Locke, but establishes that where rights circumscribe the sphere of justice
(or the violation of rights constitutes injustice), there are two kinds of justice: distributive and
rectificatory.6 Distributive justice deals with the distribution of the rights and duties of society by
its institutions. Rectificatory justice, however, exists when the system of distributive justice fails
to perform its duties. Rectificatory justice concerns itself with redressing injustice that arises out
of that failure of distributive justice, or when someone behaves in ways that are not aligned with
2

John Locke. “The Second Treatise of Government,” Two Treatises of Government. Ed. Peter Laslett. Cambridge,
UK: Cambridge University Press, 1988. Book II, sec. 4
3
Ibid., Book II, sec. 6.
4
Ibid, Book II, sec. 10
5
Bernard Boxill explains this point in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on “Black Reparations,” (The
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Ed. Edward Zalta, 18 Nov. 2015) noting a child of a murder victim would be
damaged by the murder and have a right to reparations.
6
Roberts, Rodney. "Justice and Rectification: A Taxonomy of Justice." Injustice and Rectification. Ed. Rodney
Roberts. New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 2002. 7-28, p. 8
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the principles of moral right.7 “Rectificatory justice is that form of justice employed as a means
of addressing those situations that arise when the requirements of a just system of distributive
justice have broken down.”8 An example of those requirements breaking down includes the
violation of rights. When one’s rights are violated, the victim has a right to rectification ascribed
to them.9 This means that the right to rectification is grounded in rectificatory justice.10 When a
subject possesses the right to rectification, rectificatory justice “calls for addressing both the
wrong of the injustice and any unjust losses resulting therefrom.”11
The language of reparations often tacitly endorses a view of rectificatory justice as solely
compensation. The compensation view does not exhaust the ways in which people should be
rectified for wrongs committed against them. If X had the unfortunate experience of coming
home to his door having been kicked in (giving the appearance that he had been burglarized) but
was not missing a single item in his house, the wrong would not be righted by the bungling
burglar replacing the broken door. The wrong in this example is a violation of private property
rights, and compensation does not address the rights violation itself. On Roberts’ view,
rectificatory justice certainly includes compensation, but it also requires more to be able to
establish that the offender recognizes that he has committed an injustice. He divides rectificatory
justice into four distinct requirements: restoration, compensation, apology, and punishment.
Restoration is primary, as it returns the unjustly lost resources to its rightful owner. Where
restoration cannot happen, compensation is required, although compensation may also be
required when restoration is available. Compensation, in this sense, is analogous to the notion of
7

Ibid, p. 10
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reparations. The apology is just as important as material restitution because it addresses the
wrong of the injustice – the disrespect shown to a rights-holder when violating their rights is
central to the wrong at play. In the bungling burglar example, the violation of the right to privacy
must be acknowledged by the transgressor and simply replacing the door would not address that
violation. Restoration, compensation, and apologies address what is due to the victims of
injustice, but setting unjust situations right requires addressing both parties involved in the
transgression of rights. Punishment addresses what is due to the transgressors of rights – paying
their debt of justice.
I endorse this as a broader framework for discussions of rectification to take place,
because it views reparations as one part instead of the sole part of rectifying injustice. Unlike
compensatory justice,12 retributive justice,13 and restorative justice,14 rectificatory justice is
focused on changing the entire injustice of the situation, something over and above a focus on
solely restoring moral equality, punishing the wrongdoer, or compensating the victim.

1.2: Groups as Rightholders

One might wonder if the right to rectification can be applied to a social group like Black
Americans or what is sometimes called a “group right.” Peter Jones defines a group right as “a
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right held by a group qua group.”15 A larger question is if groups should be able to be members
of the realm of moral rightholders. The goal of my project does not require me to answer if
groups should have the ability to be able to be considered moral rightholders. Whether it is
possible for a group to be a moral rightsholder, however, needs to be made explicit in this
account. Iris Marion Young’s description of social groups offers a way to explain the plausibility
of the existence of groups as moral rightholders.
Young defines a social group as “a collective of persons differentiated from at least one
other group by cultural forms, practices, or way of life.”16 Social groups can take on many forms
including ethnicity, race, gender, age, sexual orientation, religion, nationality, immigrant status,
area of residence and socio-economic status. Calling social groups “an expression of social
relations,”17 Young’s concept of a social group is based in the reality of their existence rather
than on how social groups should appear within American society. On her view, social groups
are possible in part due to social processes of differentiation, such as the sexual division of labor
creating “men” and “women” as social groups.18 Due to this differentiation, social group
members feel “a specific affinity with one another because of their similar experience or way of
life, which prompts them to associate with one another more than with those not identified with
the group, or in a different way.”19 Part of that similar experience for marginalized groups is
having their rights restricted, violated, or ignored.
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If a right can be withheld from a social group, presumably a social group can also possess
a right. It seems peculiar to withhold something from a subject that cannot, in a meaningful
sense, utilize.

1.3: Agency as a Criterion for Groups to be Rightholders

The above example suggests that groups could be legal rightholders, but it does not
necessarily suggest that groups could be moral rightholders. A criterion for being a moral
rightholder may help determine if groups are able to be rightholders. One criterion is agency, as a
subject with agency may be able to be held morally responsible for its actions, making those
actions capable of moral evaluation. In Sharing Responsibility, Larry May offered a justification
for groups as agents, noting that there are certain actions that cannot be undertaken as an
individual and are only done through the relationships formed by a group (e.g., a choir
performing).20 Groups clearly perform actions that cannot be thought of as a composition of
disparate individual actions, like an offensive line blocking during a football game. Keith
Graham notes this, saying, “…it is only the collective entity the electorate which can return a
government to power, whereas what I do is cast a vote in an election. Similarly, it is only the
football team which can win a game, whereas I perform various actions which may contribute to
the achievement of that end.”21 Even though the group is an agent, the offensive line may not be
thought of as a group that is able to possess rights, or if it did, it certainly would not be the same
sort of rights as a racial group like Black Americans. Certainly, there is a right to join the group,
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and Jones recognizes that one may receive rights as a result of membership of certain groups, but
that these are usually individual rights.22
The kinds of rights that a group has are in virtue of the characteristics of that group. If we
were to compare Black Americans and the offensive line for the Buffalo Bills, one difference
between the groups is that the offensive line for the Bills is a group which has an identity
separate from its members. The offensive line has a rotating cast of characters but is always
readily identifiable as the offensive line of the Bills. This is different from racial identity
membership. Lionel McPherson described Black social identity as follows:
“The conceptual fact remains that having some traceable African ancestry is a
necessary condition for Black American social identity. To be seen as Black
American is typically to be regarded as an American descendant of slaves in the
United States or an American who, if not a descendant of these slaves, belongs to
the same continentally identified group (i.e., African). In other words, Black
American social identity is inextricably associated with Africa and the legacy of
slavery in the United States.”23
To be Black is to have an identity that is inseparable from one’s group membership because
being Black includes being interconnected through a shared historical experience, one that is rife
with oppression that still plays a fundamental role in contemporary society.
An additional difference between Black Americans and an offensive line is that it seems
obvious that offensive lines have group agency in a way that Black Americans do not. They have
specific roles for each position to do for any given play with a shared goal of gaining positive
yardage. Black Americans, as a group, have no collectively shared goal with defined
responsibilities for each member to pursue in pursuit of accomplishing that goal. I do not want to
endorse a view of group agency that makes Black Americans a large collective that requires a
22
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decision-making process for it to be exercising agency, nor a group that has a democratically
elected representative that makes decisions for the group, as neither seems reasonable. But even
if racial groups cannot be agents, it is still fair to wonder if agency is the sole measure of whether
groups can have moral rights.

1.4: Black Americans and a Group Right to Rectification

One might wonder how a group can exercise a right when the group itself has no formal
way of exercising its group right. The concern is that rights without agency are not rights that can
be meaningfully exercised. The more fundamental problem being exposed by this concern is the
uselessness of a right that cannot itself be exercised. My response to this concern is that there are
various sorts of groups and entities whose rights are respected even though they lack traditionally
understood forms of agency, such as fetuses and the disabled. This suggests that agency may not
be necessary for moral rights possession. Jones recognizes this and indicates that a certain sort of
standing is required to be a moral rightholder. “…someone or something can hold rights only if it
is the sort of thing to which duties can be owed and which is capable of being wronged. In other
words, moral standing is a precondition of right-holding.”24 For what Jones calls the “corporate”
conception of groups, group rights exist as long as the group itself has moral standing.25 This
standing does not require a group to possess agency, nor does it require distilling a group right
into a rights that are bestowed upon individual members of the group. Moral standing can come
from how the group is socially regarded. Objects of social regard must exist, which means if the
group exists, then it is possible for it to have the proper moral standing to possess a group right.
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One example of having moral standing is to be considered a moral patient – someone or
something that is considered as part of the realm of morality even though it lacks agency. “It is
enough that we have reason to regard a group as an object of moral concern; a group does not
have to be a moral agent to be a moral patient.”26 With regards to a right to rectification, if Black
Americans meaningfully possess that right, it as a moral patient – the resulting action would
come from mainstream America responding to the demands of Black rectificatory justice. This
does not require Black Americans to have agency. Perhaps with other potential forms of group
rights, the agency problem looms large, but it is plausible that Black Americans can
meaningfully possess a moral right to rectification.
Roberts addresses this concern, noting that social groups can plausibly possess a right to
rectification even if the group is having its rights violated.
“In the case of social groups, it is at least plausible to think that, in cases where it
is impossible, without referring to the group, to spell out the content of the
discrimination from which each individual in the group has a right to be free, the
right not to be discriminated against unjustly can be legitimately thought of as a
group right. If the group is in fact discriminated against unjustly, this violation
gives rise to a right to rectification.”27
Anti-Black discrimination, in its many nefarious forms, should not be described as a continuous
series of individuals making their own individual mistakes. It is a history of systems and
individuals maintaining those systems in such a way that anti-Black injustice is an understood
fact of American life. Given Roberts’ explanation, since Black Americans have had their rights
violated as a group, they possess a group right to rectification, which calls for rectificatory
justice.
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The basic argument for Black reparations is that the appalling amount of unjust harms
committed against Blacks Americans merit rectifying those injustices, with reparations serving
as the method of rectification. There has been much ink spilled regarding this basic argument.
The topics range from whether it is possible to financially compensate the descendants of slaves
to whether or not justice should be race-blind or race-conscious given the history of injustice
towards Black Americans.28 Although these discussions are important in their own right, I think
they are often based on too narrow a view of rectification, which privileges compensation at the
expense of the real heart of the arguments for Black reparations.
On my view, the basic argument for Black reparations becomes the basic argument for
Black rectificatory justice – the violation of rights of Black Americans leads to the ascription of a
group right to rectification for Black Americans, one which calls for rectificatory justice which
comes in the forms of restoration, compensation, apologies, and punishment. Borrowing from
Roberts, the violation of rights automatically entails that the victim of the rights violation
possesses a right to rectification, one that demands rectificatory justice. What makes this
interesting is that there is a great deal of national skepticism about Black Americans’ possessing
a right to rectification. This skepticism exists even though there is ample evidence to suggest that
Black Americans are owed rectificatory justice.
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Section 2: A Brief Recent History of Anti-Black Injustice in America

In prior eras, anti-Black injustice took on multiple forms: chattel slavery, being formally
ostracized by the country following Emancipation,29 sundown towns, Jim Crow laws, the Plessy
v. Ferguson ruling, restricting Blacks’ access to property ownership and voting rights,
misrepresentations of Black Americans in the news using racist stereotypes such as welfare
queens and thugs as accurate depictions of Black life, and outright anti-Black violence
highlighted by lynch mobs coming for less prominent Black Americans and assassinations for
more prominent Black Americans. One would be naïve to equate America in the aftermath of
Emancipation to present-day America insofar as the potential for progress for Black Americans.
Two generations of Black Americans have been able to exercise legal and political rights (not
without interference from those who opposed any idea of Black progress) that were not in the
realm of possibility for the overwhelming majority of Black people who have been in America
since its inception. The fact that Black Americans currently possess more opportunity to live an
unencumbered life than prior generations, however, does not mean that Black Americans do not
presently suffer anti-Black injustice as a significant aspect of their experience.
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2.1: Anti-Black Injustice

Present day, anti-Black injustice takes on, at the very least, two different appearances:
anti-Black violence and the disparities that result from anti-Black discrimination. It is important
to note that anti-Black injustice can manifest itself in a host of different ways, but I have chosen
to use these two categories to encapsulate what I have so far described as anti-Black injustice.
Anti-Black discrimination operates as a justifying rationale which informs anti-Black
violence as well as offers an explanation for why Black Americans are in the social, economic,
and political positions that they are in. Anti-Black discrimination within virtually all levels of
society has been demonstrated throughout a litany of social scientific studies, from how Black
students are punished30 to how Black people are over policed and receive harsher punishments
for the same crimes that white people commit.31 Anti-Black discrimination can often lead to antiBlack violence, as seen in the killings of Tamir Rice, Yvette Smith, Walter Scott, Sandra Bland,
Eric Garner, and Michael Brown. It led to the murder of nine Black churchgoers by a young
white man who was fearful of a race war.
Anti-Black discrimination manifests itself in how Black Americans live. As sociologist
Douglas Massey suggests, systemic racism exists and maintains social stratification. He notes
that there were categorical mechanisms in place to maintain the position of Blacks as a racially
designated underclass before and after Emancipation.32 This included the establishment of laws
that criminalized Black Americans and negative Black archetypes and stereotypes that influence
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the nation’s views on the Black experience. Ellis Cose explained how even upwardly mobile
Blacks still felt constrained in their careers by a racially-biased glass ceiling and racially-biased
work interactions.33
I have discussed the constraints of anti-Black discrimination on Black American life in a
prior publication, noting that anti-Black discrimination manifests itself across all levels of
society:
“Should you need more contemporary evidence, there is the racial wealth gap,34
the racial education gap,35 the racial unemployment gap,36 the racial
homeownership gap,37 studies showing Black Americans receive unfair treatment
with loans, job applications and job evaluations,38 and studies showing whites
view Blacks as threatening even as children.39 Lastly, feel free to check the
comments section of your favorite website.”40
In very tangible ways, anti-Black injustice plays a pervasive role in both the day-to-day
operations as well as the future life prospects of Black Americans..
Although fraught with the concern that some terrible event will befall them due to being
Black, the contemporary picture of Black life in America is not one wherein every Black
American is always suffering anti-Black injustice. To make that claim would be to ignore the
existence of a class of politically, culturally, and/or economically powerful Black Americans that
33
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has developed in the wake of landmark civil rights legislation, including Oprah Winfrey,
President Barack Obama, Congressman John Lewis, Secretary of State Condeleeza Rice,
Michael Jordan, LeBron James, Beyoncé, and Sean “Jay-Z” Carter. That a small set of Black
Americans have achieved “great success in the face of a society that regularly reminds them that
Blacks have very little value”41 does not change the fact that the reality for many Black
Americans managing the world begins from an assumption that there are structural levels of antiBlack injustice:
“The average Black American suffers from an inability to earn the same wage as
her white counterpart or even Black male counterpart; she suffers from a
debilitating lack of reliable public goods and services in her community; and she
suffers from limited life prospects that still make it an astounding and historic
phenomenon to have Blacks in positions of power in society.”42
The point that I am trying to emphasize is twofold: that a central part of being Black in America
is managing and surviving anti-Black injustice; and that anti-Black injustice is not simply
relegated to past eras but is an ongoing phenomenon for Black Americans.

Section 3: Recent Discussions on Rectifying Anti-Black Injustice
Some scholars have argued that it is difficult to articulate a number of key aspects of
rectifying past injustices. As a result, they argue that it is not plausible, practical, or morally
necessary to offer rectification for Black Americans. Janna Thompson criticized arguments in
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support of rectification for victims of the effects of past injustice as weak or unsatisfactory.43
Jeremy Waldron argued that after enough generations pass, some injustices are not worth
correcting any longer.44 Stephen Kershnar argued that it is impossible to offer reparations to the
descendants of slaves because it stems from an impossible to determine counterfactual.45
Those positions, while interesting for philosophical discussion, often miss the larger point
– racial injustice is not a historical phenomenon, but both historic and ongoing in such a way that
it is part of American culture, society, and politics. The U.N. Working Group of Experts on
People of African Descent recently delivered a report arguing that Black Americans are owed
reparations due to a history of “racial terrorism,” which includes “the legacy of colonial history,
enslavement, racial subordination and segregation, racial terrorism, and racial inequality.” They
note that “there has been no real commitment to reparations and to truth and reconciliation for
people of African descent.”46 Ta-Nahesi Coates, in “The Case for Reparations,” offers an outline
of the government-supported housing discrimination Black Americans faced through much of
the 20th Century. From there, he argues that there is a case to be made for reparations for antiBlack racism in America.47 Seven years earlier, Andrew Valls and Johnathan Kaplan made the
philosophical case that housing discrimination against Black Americans may require reparations
and that post-Emancipation injustice committed against Black Americans is enough for making
claims for reparations rather than specifically for the wrong of slavery.48 John Conyers annually
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introduced a bill to Congress since 1989 about addressing and analyzing claims for Black
reparations that has been ignored for nearly 30 years and likely won’t be introduced following
his recent retirement. On the official website of the Movement For Black Lives, reparations is
listed as one of its demands, and it frames the discussion of reparations through the language of
repair: “The government, responsible corporations and other institutions that have profited off of
the harm they have inflicted on Black people — from colonialism to slavery through food and
housing redlining, mass incarceration, and surveillance — must repair the harm done.”49
A number of scholars believe that Black Americans are still feeling the effects of past
injustice, ranging from slavery to the Black codes to failing to protect their rights as citizens.
Boris Bittker made a famous legal argument to hold state and federal governments accountable
for rectifying past injustices against Black Americans.50 Randall Robinson continued the
discussion, updating Bittker’s argument by focusing on the generational negative effects of
legally sanctioned racial discrimination.51
My position is that no reasonable argument exists that suggests that Black Americans
have not suffered injustices worth rectifying. Arguments against Black reparations tend to focus
on the logistics of reparations rather than the morality of reparations because it is difficult to
establish an account of Black American life without a history of sanctioned injustice.52
Arguments that agree that injustice happened in the far flung past but disagree that Black
Americans are still the victims of racial injustice focus on the anti-Black injustice of the late 19th
Century and early 20th Century while disregarding the existence of anti-Black injustice
49
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throughout the 20th and 21st centuries. Based on grievances that are both past and present, there is
a strong case that Black Americans have been unjustly harmed and such harm should grant them
a right to rectification.

Section 4: Traditional Moral Rights Possession and Anti-Black Injustice

For philosophers such as Bernard Boxill and Howard McGary, the use of the Lockean
model of rectification explicitly requires the violation of moral rights as the prerequisite for
possessing a right to rectification.53 For others, such as Molefe Kete Asante, the language of
reparations for wrongs and atrocities against Black slaves in America and their descendants
implicitly rests on the notion that committing those wrongful and atrocious acts constitute forms
of rights violations that warrant redress.54 In either case, arguments for Black reparations turn on
two premises: that Black Americans had their rights violated; and they deserve to have those
violations rectified. In this section, I will provide an account of the traditional view of moral
rights possession, an answer to the question of rectifying anti-Black injustice by the traditional
view, and present a set of problems for the view. My goal is to problematize the traditional view
enough that a different view of moral rights possession could be considered plausible for
answering why Black people have not had their injustices rectified.
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4.1: A Traditional View of Moral Rights Possession

A traditional view of moral rights possession is that possessing moral rights is a feature
of the kind of being one is. Since the considerations for possessing moral rights are seen as
internal to the subject as opposed to external to the subject, this view is also referred to as
“internalism.” Proponents of internalism, like Joel Feinberg and Loren Lomasky, argue that
moral rights exist as part of a class of natural, pre-social rights. Lomasky describes this, saying,
“If I have rights, it is because of something about me, not something that resides in the messy
world outside.”55 Taking these rights as natural means that they exist prior to and independently
of society. One version of an internalist position can be summarized up as follows: “…for any
moral right R to be correctly ascribed to some subject S, S must possess a certain nature, or some
property P, the possession of which confers R upon S.”56 Another approach to internalism is the
valid claims approach, which asserts that a morally valid claim is both necessary and sufficient
for possessing a moral right.57 Feinberg defines possessing a moral right as follows: “a man has a
moral right when he has a claim the recognition of which is called for – not (necessarily) by legal
rules – but by moral principles, or the principles of an enlightened conscience.”58 In the first
case, it is the kind of being that gives a subject a moral right. In the second it is equating the
possession of a morally valid claim with possessing a moral right, based on some fact of the
subject. The internalist view is a common approach to moral and political philosophy, with many
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liberal democratic societies operating from a premise that persons possess a set of natural moral
rights that directly informs the responsibilities of the state to its citizens.59

4.2: Internalism’s Explanation of Anti-Black Injustice

In the language of moral rights, a traditional view can explain anti-Black injustice as a
consequence of Black people having their moral rights violated. Black people actually being
people helps underscore the strength of a traditional view, since the person is generally
considered a paradigm for moral rightholders that allows us to “criticize as immoral certain
practices and institutions that violate human beings (e.g., chattel slavery).”60 Being able to
clearly assess wrongdoing through the language of natural rights has been an apparent benefit to
this approach. Derrick Darby notes this, saying, “Perhaps the primary reason why [internalism] is
the dominant conception of moral rights possession is the presumed political and moral utility of
positing the existence of a class of preconventional rights.”61 The idea of moral rights existing
prior to society gives people a vehicle for critiquing the moral failings of society as violating
those rights. Feinberg was a chief proponent of the political benefits of internalism, as he saw the
woman’s movement in the mid-to-late 20th century as an example of appealing to moral rights.
“What they were asserting is that they have a right to be granted a right, a moral right against the
state to be given a new legal right. The moral right functions as the basis of their entitlement to
the legal right analogous to the way in which a title establishes a claim to property.”62 Darby
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offers an endorsement of the perceived value of pre-social rights, noting the presumed strength
of the internalist view:
“Believers in rights that spring from a subject’s being, whether they be called
natural, human, or moral rights, can appeal to these rights to mark the scope and
limits of government, institutional, and individual conduct. They can serve as
boundaries that protect their bearers from repressive political and nonpolitical
institutions or even from other individuals. Moreover, they allow their defenders
to morally criticize social and individual conduct whenever it violates these
alleged “natural” rights, whether or not governments, societies, or individuals
acknowledge their existence or implement them in conventional rule systems.”63
The internalist response to why rectification has not happened for Black Americans
cannot be that the wrongs did not happen nor can it be that Black Americans do not possess a
right to rectification for past and present injustice. The existence of the valid claim for the right
to rectification supports possession of that right as long as some feature of that subject supports
righthood. Anti-Black injustice being understood as a form of disrespect gives internalists two
avenues for describing the validity of moral rights possession, in particular a moral right to
rectification for Black Americans. On one hand, the experience of disrespect is able to happen
because of the kind of persons that we are. That is to say, one can be disrespected as a person in
virtue of the fact that persons are inherently deserving of respect. They are due this respect
because of their inherent moral worth. On the other hand, the grounds for making the claim that
Black Americans are having their moral worth denied is based on the inherent moral worth of
Black Americans as persons. Recall that Locke mentions that not respecting a person’s right to
rectification is tantamount to ignoring their personhood. Effectively, internalists have an appeal
to the respect for personhood, in virtue of whatever property makes one a person, as a central
premise for the validity of moral rights possession. Internalists are not ignorant to facts about the
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social world, and could well say that the right to rectification exists for Black Americans but is
being denied by a racist society. This suggests that, although the validity for moral rights
possession exists because of the kind of persons Black Americans are, there is an additional
important dynamic in the process of moral rights possession – the social world that one lives in.

Section 5: Darbyian Problems with Internalism

Given how important moral rights possession is for pronouncing when one has been
wronged or to argue for new legal protections, a central issue for the traditional account is how to
determine whether or not a subject is a moral rightholder. Presumably, moral rights are not
offered to all living beings qua living beings, so there must be a rationale for why people, not
houseflies, are generally considered to possess moral rights. That rationale is based on how one
determines what the relevant property is that provides the status of moral rightholder, regardless
if it allows one to be able to possess a valid claim or be endowed with moral rights. There are
multiple ways of determining that property, so although internalism is helpful for offering
validity to moral claims, the lack of consensus about the relevant right-endowing property
presents a difficulty for internalism.
I am following from Darby’s arguments against internalism to develop my analysis. This
begins by examining the claim, paradigmatic to interalism, that “humanity” grounds moral rights
possession.

21

5.1: Darbyian Problems with Humanity as a Paradigm for Moral
Rightholders

Humanity could be taken up as grounds for moral rights possession, which appears to be
one way to save internalism. This, however, provokes further inquiry into the nature of
humanity. As a standard, humanity has particular struggles. For example, some humans (e.g.,
Jews in Nazi Germany, Black slaves) have been treated inhumanely but the explanation for this
cannot be that they are not human.64 Additionally, this approach does not do well to help explain
how full admission into what Darby calls “the realm of moral rightholders” is considered
questionable for certain entities, such as infants, fetuses, the mentally disabled, and the comatose
while other non-human entities, such as plants, animals, and corporations are considered
potentially able to join the realm of moral rightholders.65
The realm of moral rightholders is a description of the theoretical space that regulates
whether or not one is considered a moral rightholder. Those who are deemed entrants into the
realm of moral rightholders are able to enter because they satisfy whatever criteria is deemed
necessary to be considered a moral rightholder, regardless of one’s theory of moral rights
possession. Being a member of the realm of moral rightholders does not mean that one holds full
moral rights, as that will also depend on the nature of how a subject is admitted to the realm of
moral rightholders. This helps to explain why certain subjects may be viewed as full or partial
members of the realm of moral rightholders, as humanity offers full membership for some and
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limited membership for others, whereas the capacity to suffer offers wider membership to the
realm of moral rightholders.
Although internalists agree that moral rights are possessed pre-socially, they differ on
what set of properties allows one to claim possession of moral rights. Agency, rationality,
sentience, the capacity to make claims, having interests, or some combination of them have all
been offered as candidates for right-endowing properties. Although contemporary internalists
often do not appeal to a theological justification for moral rights possession, the lack of
consensus about the relevant property of humanity is a problem for internalism. One could try a
pluralist approach to humanity, however, one would wonder if this implies a requirement of all
of those qualities to be considered a human, a specific number (e.g., 3 out of 5) of qualities, or if
there are major and minor qualities (and if so, what determines those levels).
When pressed by the concerns about differentiating between humans and non-human
animals, internalists must offer a more specific property than humanity, and there is no clear
consensus for what the relevant property is for internalists. The humanity paradigm is often
resisted by animal activists on these grounds, arguing that a being with the capacity to suffer
should be considered a paradigm instance of a subject that can possess moral rights.66 The
Argument from Marginal Cases helps demonstrate how difficult it is to pinpoint humanity
without excluding marginal cases, such as fetuses or the mentally disabled.67
“So despite the fact that many rights internalists use the humanity standard as an
intuitive starting point for theorizing about what constitutes the relevant moral right-endowing
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nature, they clearly do not rest with it.”68 Having to offer something in place of humanity, “the
appeal to the concept of humanity turns out to be nothing more than a placeholder for many
would-be candidates for the title of relevant rights-endowing property.”69 The humanity standard
also suggests that inclusion into and exclusion from the realm of moral rightholders is beyond
human authority. One’s placement into the realm of moral rightholders stems from having a
particular property that is out of one’s control to possess, however humanity is understood. As
such, even if there is good reason to change the relevant property for entry into the realm of
moral rightholders (e.g., ending oppressive practices against a particular group), doing so is
challenging the standard of humanity itself in such a way that humanity then does not seem to be
the best paradigm for moral rightholder. While that may not be a troublesome result for those
who have a secure status as moral rightholders, it is for those who have had their status as moral
rightholders challenged, “since it represents their exclusion from the realm of moral rightholders
(and the associated benefits) as an ontological shortcoming – an unfortunate result of failing to
be endowed with the relevant nature or failing to be a certain kind of being.”70

5.2: Shades of Externalism within Internalism

Another potential problem is the selection process for who should be able to join the
realm of moral rightholders. This is problematic because it does not resolve the initial worry
regarding the relevant right-endowing property and because in trying to produce the appropriate
membership in the realm of moral rightholders, internalists appeal to socially informed
considerations. Darby surmises that internalists engage in a “reflective equilibrium” process of
68
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squaring their pre-theoretical judgments regarding who is a moral rightholder with the theoretical
criteria for moral rights possession.71 He describes the process as follows:
“After identifying a class of moral judgments that we think are intuitively correct,
we look for a set of general principles that would lead us to make these same
judgments independently of our pretheoretical moral beliefs. We then proceed
both to modify our principles and to revise our judgments, working back and forth
until we reach a state of equilibrium in which we are no longer inclined to modify
our principles or revise our judgments but are prepared to accept the principles
selected and the judgments they support.”72
On Darby’s view, internalists that do this process are not necessarily doing something
problematic – for example, if one were to shift away from rationality as the relevant moral
rights-endowing property upon recognizing that rationality excludes the mentally disabled from
being moral rightholders, and this clashed with their pre-theoretical belief about the mentally
disabled being moral rightholders, then that person would search for a different relevant moral
right-endowing property that better fits their pre-theoretical beliefs until achieving some
coherence between their pre-theoretical beliefs and the beings desired to be in the realm of moral
rightholders.73 Darby considers it problematic, however, when internalists take their preferred
relevant property as the objective foundation of moral rights, or “the property that all rational
parties must take to be necessary for the possession of moral rights.”74 That this process occurs
in general is a particularly troublesome issue for internalists, as the influence of practical
considerations for determining moral rights possession is an externalist approach to determining
who can participate in the realm of moral rightholders. Darby elaborates, saying “If, for example,
we want animals to be treated with respect, then we may take them to be moral rightholders. The
71
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same goes for babies, collectives, and trees: if we want them to be treated in certain ways and not
others we may take them to be moral rightholders as well.”75 By focusing on a set of principles
that will correspond with the beings that we want to be moral rightholders, internalists attempt to
ground pre-social moral rights possession within socially informed, practical considerations.

Section 6: Rights Externalism as a Viable Alternative

Since rights internalism lacks consensus on the appropriate right-endowing property as
well as seems to rely on an externalist process for determining the appropriate property, Darby
offers an alternative approach to moral rights possession, one where social recognition is the
determining factor in possessing moral rights. He rejects a traditional view for one that is
informed by a history of Black Americans seemingly having fewer moral rights protected or
respected than their white counterparts, which directly affects the ways that Black Americans can
act or be treated. This view, rights externalism, is “the thesis that a subject’s status as a
rightholder is secured not on account of it having a certain nature, but on account of it being
afforded a certain sort of social recognition.” Moral rights possession, on the rights externalist
view, is a social fact rather than an internal one and requires more than just morally valid claims:
“Insofar as I embrace the strong interpretation I contend that there is a conceptual
connection between moral rights possession and the instantiation of certain social
practice conditions that include the authoritative social recognition and
enforcement of morally valid claims. Hence the rights recognition thesis is that
social practices play an essential role in grounding moral rights in this strong
sense.”76
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Darby and internalists who use the valid claims approach both share the same intuition regarding
morally valid claims – they both agree that these claims are necessary for moral rights
possession. Valid claims internalists, however, take morally valid claims as both necessary and
sufficient. For Darby, this ignores the important part of having moral rights – being able to
exercise those rights. What allows a subject to exercise its rights is having social practices that
facilitate the exercising of its rights. By moral rights, he refers to a morally valid claim to act or
be treated in a certain way that is socially ratified.77 Although he does not say so explicitly, this
account suffices for both positive (ways to act) and negative (ways of being treated) rights.
Imagine the case of having a moral right to sit in Starbucks. Having this moral right includes the
“social reality of being able to do so without fear of being hauled away by local law
enforcement.”78 This does not preclude one from being concerned that local law enforcement
might not recognize that moral right, but provided that there is a higher positive authority that
can enforce being able to sit in Starbucks (or punish those who violate that right), then the right
is a social reality.79 Moral rights become social realities when they are exercisable and/or
protected in a society, not merely due to morally valid arguments about their existence.
There is disagreement about which social practices are relevant to the rights externalist,
as well as the kind of moral justification for grounding moral rights. L.W. Sumner, in The Moral
Foundations of Rights, offers an account of moral rights possession that is similarly constrained
by social practices. Sumner is one of a number of philosophers who have advanced a form of the
rights externalism thesis, including Rex Martin and T.H. Green. He places an emphasis on more
informal social practices being able to ground moral rights, which is broader than Darby’s
77
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view.80 Sumner argues that the appropriate moral justification for the recognition, whether legal
or conventional, of these social practices is a consequentialist one. He is also aware that one
might offer a different moral justification for a given social practice, such as a contractarian
one.81 Although Sumner and Darby share similar intuitions, Darby does not think there needs to
be a commitment to one moral theory. Since “no substantive moral theory has been proven to be
the one true moral theory, each having its defenders and detractors,” it is premature to commit
one’s self to a specific theory and doing so requires both an ardent defense of the chosen theory
as well as undermining other plausible moral theories.82

6.1: Darbyian Institutional Rights Externalism

Darby’s account of moral rights possession grounds moral rights in social practices, but
the relevant social practices for him are ones that afford a subject “institutional respect.” He
describes this view as such: “…for any moral right R to be correctly ascribed to some subject S it
is necessary that S be afforded institutional respect.”83 Institutional respect is having a certain
way of acting or being treated socially ratified.84 To explain this, Darby takes a view of rights
from Rex Martin’s A System of Rights, wherein all rights are “established ways of acting or being
treated.”85 He further explains:
“Furthermore, I shall assume that the social establishment of ways of acting or
being treated by certain authorities is required to convert a mere way of acting or
being treated into a right. The point is not merely that these authorities agree that
80
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the relevant ways of acting and being treated constitute rights. Rather the point is
much stronger, namely that they can do things that have the effect of turning them
into rights in much the same way that an umpire can turn a pitch into a strike or a
queen can make a man a knight. To be sure, which authorities are empowered to
turn them into rights, and which of their activities are relevant, can vary from
society to society and even within the same society, depending upon the kind of
right at issue.”86
Darby assumes that the social practices that confer legal rights are a paradigmatic
example of affording subjects institutional respect, both because he believes legality to be a
strong form of protection for rightholders and also as a means of theoretical exposition since
legal social practices are often more readily defined.87 Darby embraces H.L.A. Hart’s work as a
backdrop for understanding legal rights, one in which a rule of law is one that is valid within an
operative legal system.88 A rule is valid within a legal system if the rule comes from a source that
is recognized within that legal system as a source of valid laws.89 I cannot claim that a decree I
utter is a rule of law because I am not recognized as a valid source of laws. If I were a dictator,
however, my decree would be a rule of law because I would be recognized as a valid source of
laws. A legal system that is operative is also one that is “generally efficacious.”90 It is efficacious
when “the rules regulating the conduct of individuals under its jurisdiction are generally
complied with, and the rules conferring legislation and adjudicative powers on public officials
are endorsed by these officials…”91 Given the background of legal rights that Darby endorses, he
concludes that the conditions for possessing legal rights are: “S possesses legal rights if and only
if S’s acting in a certain way or being treated in a certain way is legally established within an
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operative legal system.”92 Legally establishing practices requires two activities: recognizing the
right; and enforcing the practice as a right. The relevant activity for recognizing the right will
differ depending on the society – this includes a nation’s constitution or a judicial ruling.
Enforcing and maintaining the right requires the authorities in charge of enforcing and
maintaining the right – it takes more than words to establish rights, it also requires actions to
enforce and protect those rights. Since legal rights possession is Darby’s paradigm for
institutional respect, he explicitly connects the two, saying:
“…it follows that a sufficient condition of a subject’s being afforded institutional
respect, which itself is a necessary condition of it possessing moral rights, is that a
way of treating the subject (or a way in which the subject might act) be legally
ratified within an operative legal system. Hence, on this view, the social practices
relevant to affording a subject institutional respect, and ultimately moral rights,
are those formal practices involved in making it the case that the subject possesses
legal rights.”93
Institutional respect is a necessary but not sufficient condition for moral rightholding on this
view – these social practices still require a moral justification, and Darby thinks any reasonable
moral theory can serve as a justification for the relevant social practices (utilitarianism, virtue
ethics, etc.).

6.2: Benefits to Darbyian Institutional Rights Externalism

As mentioned above, a potential virtue to institutional rights externalism rather than
Sumner’s is that it does not commit itself to any particular moral justification, as more than one
theory might fit the criteria for justification. Another way of understanding this is to consider the
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institutional externalist use of the phrase, “X has a moral right to Y” to be an abbreviation of “X
has a social practice Y that is a) socially ratified by a relevant authority; and b) morally justified,
where this moral justification can come from any relevant moral theory.” The case of animals
having a moral right to life is one that can be used as an example for how institutional
externalism can confer moral rights. If animals have a moral right to life when they receive the
relevant kind of institutional respect within an operative legal system, then either animals are
afforded institutional respect within that system or they are not. If they are afforded institutional
respect and the relevant social practices are morally justified, then animals have a moral right to
life. If they are not afforded institutional respect, then they do not possess that right. However, if
the practices required to afford animals institutional respect are recognized within that legal
system, and these practices are morally justified, then that would instantiate animals having a
moral right to life.94
The animal case provokes a question about the potential limitations of who can be a
moral rightholder, or how broad the realm of moral rightholders is. These limits are not set by
the kind of being one is; they are set by practical considerations.95 Institutional respect can be
given to subjects that “we are able to maintain and enforce a way of acting toward some
subject,”96 which disqualifies ghosts, aliens, and puddles of mud from being afforded
institutional respect. There is no way of acting towards them that can be practically enforced. It
does, however, leave open a broad possibility for potential rightholders, provided there is a way
of acting towards them that can be practically enforced. This could include corporations,
animals, fetuses, and the mentally disabled. The nature of the institutional respect shown differs
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from entity to entity because of the kind of entity it is perceived to be, with such perception itself
also being set by practical considerations.

6.3: Non-Legal Social Practices and Institutional Respect

Darby does recognize that his view allows for non-legal, less formal social practices to
produce the institutional respect required to possess moral rights.97 Although it takes the social
ratification of a practice to convert it to a right, grounding moral rights can come from less
formal means of ratification, such as the practices of a social body. This includes a family, a
religious community, a labor union, or a local community.98 “Consequently, subjects could be
afforded institutional respect by various social bodies, which means that moral rights could be
generated by various social bodies.”99 Through the mutual recognition that exists in the social
practices of these relations, Darby argues that the institutional respect needed for moral rights
possession is possible. Although he does consider legal rights as a paradigm example for
institutional respect, it does not foreclose other forms of institutional respect from existing that
can provide a subject with the social standing required for moral rights possession.100 The
function of appealing to moral rights arguments within an externalist framework is not to supply
the moral justification of said right, but to “indicate or announce the existence of such a
justification, which is ultimately provided in other, more basic, normative terms.”101 Arguing that
Black Americans have a moral right not to be called by a racial slur is to abbreviate an indication
that “a deeper moral justification can be given for the validity of some way of acting or being
97
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treated,”102 with “not calling Black people racial slurs” being a way of treating Black Americans.
That doing so would be harmful is a basic moral justification that validates this social practice.
It is non-legal forms of institutional respect that Darby utilizes to offer an account of how
moral rights claims can exist and be denied within an externalist framework. Using the example
of Black slaves, he argues that the internal communities in which they lived, which included
families, provided the mutual recognition that grounds the institutional respect needed for moral
rights possession, even though the larger society did not recognize them as in the realm of moral
rightholders.103 He uses T.H. Green as an example for how one can make an anti-slavery
argument within an externalist framework.

6.4: Green and Darby on Slavery

Green considers an individual possessing a moral right to happen when one “possesses a
morally valid claim to act or be treated in a certain way that is conceded or recognized by
society, or more precisely, by other individuals who participate in social relations of mutually
recognizing and being recognized.”104 This view has at least two implications: that there can be
unrecognized yet morally valid claims by society; and that there can be recognized yet not
morally valid claims by society.105 Green’s anti-slavery views run into trouble, however, when
he asserts that slaves hold a set of natural rights that American society refuses to recognize. On
the face of it, it appears that Green has succumbed to an internalist view of moral rightholding,
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one where the existence of pre-social rights are the basis upon which a critique of slavery can be
launched.
Arguing for a more sympathetic reading of Green, Darby considers Green’s account to
consider natural rights as those that are independent of the state but not independent of all social
relations. One moral right at stake in a discussion of slavery is the right to make one’s own life.
Possessing this basic right is not prior to all social relations for the externalist. Being able to
make one’s own life (pursue their own ends) is able to happen within certain social contexts and
not within other social contexts. This can only happen if “other individuals within the
community of agents are prepared to afford him the opportunity to make his own life either by
not interfering with his pursuit of these ends or by assisting him in various ways in attaining
them.”106 Being able to exercise this right is determined by the community in which one lives. If
the community recognizes the right of pursuing one’s own ends as a good thing for community
members to have, then that right can be exercised. This is not just the case for the right to make
one’s own life – this is the case for rights in general, as social recognition plays a constitutive
role in their existence for both Green and Darby. It is the fact that people participate in
communities which also complicates the nature of moral rights possession:
“For one thing, all of these communities can be a source of rights to the extent
that they can afford (or withhold) the social recognition that is partly constitutive
of having rights. What is more the social practices in these various communities
can be in conflict with one another so that an individual could be afforded the
relevant social recognition that allowed him to be able to reckon on the
opportunity to act or be treated in certain ways in one community but not in
others, with the most significant conflict arising between the state and all of the
other communities.”107
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In the case of the Black slave, she does live in community with others in such a way that she can
receive the institutional respect required for possessing the moral right to make one’s own life, as
a mother, sister, daughter, aunt, friend, or member of the larger slave community on her
plantation. These moral rights are neither natural nor products from the state, but come from
non-state sanctioned social relations. These relations presuppose that the participants have
certain moral capacities. This is not necessarily a claim about personhood but is a claim about
their ability to make moral decisions in some relevant manner. The acknowledgement of the
slave’s moral capacities “suffices to establish the moral force of the validity of the slave’s claim
to be free to make his own life in cooperation with others conditionally upon allowing like
activity in others.”108 The claim still requires being recognized by those who may allow the
slave to make her own life in cooperation with others. If these conditions are able to be obtained
in pre-political social relations, then slaves can possess moral rights that are prior to political
society but not independent of all social relations.
Although it allows for the possibility of slaves to enter the realm of moral rightholders,
Darby considers this not the ideal, as “there is no substitute for having these rights recognized
within social relations in the larger political society.”109 This explains his preference for legal
rights as a paradigm, but his emphasis on legal institutions leaves room to develop his account
regarding the less formal institutions in America that show institutional respect to Black
Americans.
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Closing Remarks: Defending Institutional Rights Externalism

Institutional rights externalism should be considered a viable alternative for describing
moral rights possession and it does have at least two benefits. First, it avoids messy issues of
having to define personhood, humanity or some other arbitrary criteria for moral rights
possession. Secondly, it is able to be used as a descriptive theory of moral rights possession,
precisely because it is an account that is designed to be able to address “those who are excluded
from the realm of moral rightholders, what is at stake in their exclusion, and what is needed to
overcome it.”110 For example, rather than saying that racism affects the perception of personhood
of Black people (and getting bogged down in a difficult issue of what makes someone a person),
one could say that racism affects how Black Americans are socially recognized and as a result,
their full membership in the realm of moral rightholders.
A greater benefit of this approach is that being able to determine the scope of moral
rightholders is within our control instead of a fact based on the kind of being one is. “We can
extend and withhold institutional respect, perhaps guided by our practical concerns and political
agendas; in addition, we can supply moral justifications and argue against them. Thus, the
possession of this status is more within our control…”111 These practical considerations can
include ontological considerations about whatever moral theory one uses to justify the relevant
social practices. In being able to argue for extending or withholding institutional respect, we
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have more control on the status of being a moral rightsholder than relying on being fortunate
enough to possess the appropriate right-endowing property.
I recognize that drawing on this view is controversial, but I do so without adopting his
view as a normative account for moral rights possession and while recognizing that it is not
without problems.112 This view functions for my work as a way to describe the moral conditions
of the Black American experience. Instead of articulating certain forms of anti-Black injustice
towards Black Americans as a violation of natural rights, we might be better served to consider
the location of Black Americans in the realm of moral rightholders as connected to how they are
socially recognized. Black Americans have ways of acting or being treated socially ratified that
have resulted in anti-Black injustice becoming a basic tenet of society. This view takes seriously
the diachronic nature of anti-Black injustice towards Black Americans; something Darby argues
is not a part of contemporary political philosophy. “…especially among philosophers of color
and an increasing number of Anglo American philosophers, there is a powerful trend of
criticizing orthodox political philosophy for not taking race and the history and practice of white
supremacy and black subordination in the United States seriously…”113 I take him to be right
about this, which is one of the reasons that I developed this project. In the following chapter, I
will apply Darby’s institutional rights externalist framework to the American context to
determine ways that Black Americans are being shown institutional respect by non-legal
institutions.
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Chapter 2: Social Recognition in the American Context: A Defense of
Rights Externalism

Darby’s explanation of institutional respect as social recognition is purposefully vague so
that it can have use for different societies while focusing on legal rights as a paradigm for
showing institutional respect to make his case. He acknowledges that there are other institutions
that can provide the relevant institutional respect for moral rights possession. This aspect of his
view is where I add my contribution – offering an account of some of the broader, non-legal
institutions that provide institutional respect and what that entails within the American context.
Nancy Fraser’s views on misrecognition offers a blueprint for understanding institutional respect
at a societal level in America.

Section 1: Evaluation and Interpretation: Institutional Respect within
the American Context
Recall from Darby:
“Although it takes the social ratification of a practice to convert it to a right,
grounding moral rights can come from less formal means of ratification, such as
the practices of a social body. This includes a family, a religious community, a
labor union, or a local community.1 “Consequently, subjects could be afforded
institutional respect by various social bodies, which means that moral rights could
be generated by various social bodies.”2
Fraser’s account of misrecognition offers an explanation for how other informal institutions
afford subjects institutional respect. Here is Fraser’s account of misrecognition:
1
2
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“To be misrecognized, in my view, is not simply to be thought ill of, looked down
on, or devalued in others’ conscious attitudes or mental beliefs. It is rather to be
denied the status of a full partner in social interaction and prevented from
participating as a peer in social life…as a consequence of institutionalized
patterns of interpretation and evaluation that constitute one as comparatively
unworthy of respect or esteem. When such patterns of disrespect and disesteem
are institutionalized, for example, in law, social welfare, medicine, and/or popular
culture…the resulting harm is in either case all too real. In my conception,
therefore, misrecognition is an institutionalized social relation, not a
psychological state.”3
For Fraser, misrecognition stems from institutionalized patterns of interpreting and evaluating
that determine how one ought to be treated. Based on my account, a pattern of interpretation and
evaluation being institutionalized is the process of social recognition. Being shown institutional
respect is not simply the evaluation of a subject by another individual; it is the institutionalized
understanding of a person or people that locates them in the realm of moral rightholders. Social
recognition as institutional respect, then, “is an institutionalized social relation, not a
psychological state.”4 This social relation can be laudatory or derogatory, however one conceives
of these notions (e.g., respect/disrespect, esteem/disesteem). Importantly, these social relations
can come from various institutions, including popular culture. Fraser omits the institution of
education, which is another institution that has the ability to participate in institutionalizing
patterns of evaluation and interpretation. Stating my view while using Fraser’s language amounts
to this:
To be institutionally recognized, on my view, is not simply to be thought well of
or looked down on in others’ beliefs. It is to be afforded a location in the sphere of
moral rightholders without guarantee of the sorts of rights a subject possesses.
The determination of what rights a subject possesses comes as a consequence of
institutionalized patterns of interpretation and evaluation of social practices and
3
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moral claims. When these interpretive and evaluative patterns are institutionalized
in spaces like law, welfare, medicine, popular culture, and education, the results,
whether harmful or beneficial to a subject, are all too real. On my view, to
understand social recognition as showing institutional respect is to understand
social recognition as an institutionalized social relation, not a psychological state.
Based on Darby’s explanation of institutional rights externalism, both formal and informal
institutions are able to produce the kind of social recognition required to possess moral rights.
Applying my reformulation of social recognition within institutional rights externalism shows
how multiple institutions participate in the development and establishment of various interpretive
and evaluative patterns regarding Black Americans.

Section 2: An Example of Legal Institutional Respect
Darby’s focus on legal rights as a paradigm of institutional respect begs for a focus on the
interpretation and evaluation of Black Americans within the criminal justice system. Michelle
Alexander offers an account of the relationship between Black Americans and the criminal
justice system, arguing that significant differences exist in how Black and white Americans are
treated within the criminal justice system come from a series of interrelated government
structures, from the branches of government down to individual police departments.

2.1: A Recent History of the Relationship between Law Enforcement and
Black Americans
Alexander argues that the criminal justice system has been able to become a second form
of Jim Crow-style policies designed to maintain a Black underclass. Throughout the era
following landmark civil rights legislation throughout the middle of the 20th Century, a number
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of changes to the political landscape occurred, including the rise of poor whites as
disenfranchised by their social status, and race as a central tenet to one’s political worldview.
“In the 1968 election, race eclipsed class as the organizing principle of American
politics, and by 1972, attitudes on racial issues rather than socioeconomic status
were the primary determinant of voters’ political self-identification. The late
1960s and early 1970s marked the dramatic erosion in the belief among workingclass whites that the condition of the poor, or those who prosper, was the result of
a faulty economic system that needed to be challenged.”5
In response to that eroded belief were the presidential campaigns of Richard Nixon and, in
particular, Ronald Reagan, both of whom enacted policies through the coded language of “law
and order” that would damage Black communities across America. “To great effect, Reagan
echoed white frustration in race-neutral terms through implicit racial appeals. His ‘colorblind’
rhetoric on crime, welfare, taxes, and states’ rights was clearly understood by white (and black)
voters as having a racial dimension, though claims to that effect were impossible to prove.”6
Upon his election, Reagan mounted the War on Drugs, complete with additional funding
for federal anti-drug operations and a massive media campaign that overly sensationalized the
devastating effects of crack-cocaine on inner-city, largely Black, neighborhoods. This was done
without highlighting the terrible economic blight many of these neighborhoods were suffering
before the introduction of crack-cocaine to their communities.7 Doing so helped maintain public
and congressional support for the War on Drugs, which led to police crackdowns on Black
communities as well as articles typically featuring Black stereotypes of “crack whores,’ ‘crack
babies,’ and ‘gangbangers,’ reinforcing already prevalent racial stereotypes of black women as
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irresponsible, selfish ‘welfare queens,’ and black men as ‘predators’ – part of an inferior and
criminal subculture.”8

2.2: The War on Drugs and Mass Incarceration
Legislation that supported the War on Drugs began in earnest with the signing of the
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, which “included mandatory minimum sentences for the
distribution of cocaine, including far more severe punishment for distribution of crack –
associated with blacks – than powder cocaine, associated with whites.”9 This continued with an
updated version in 1988, one that included the ability to be evicted from public housing by “any
tenant who allows any form of drug-related criminal activity to occur on or near public housing
premises,” eliminated federal student loan access for those convicted of a drug offense, expanded
the use of the death penalty for drug-related offenses, and included new mandatory minimums on
drug offenses.10
War on Drugs policies continued under the Clinton administration, who doubled down on
being tough on crime endorsing policies such as a federal “three strikes and you’re out” life
sentence mandatory minimum; placing a lifetime ban on eligibility for welfare and food stamps
for those convicted of a drug offense; and making it easier for public housing to exclude those
with a criminal history.11 Drug sweeps on buses travelling interstate became a commonplace
occurrence, particularly since they were ruled constitutional by the United States Supreme Court,
overturning the Florida Supreme Court’s ruling. The court ruled that it was constitutional based
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on whether a reasonable person would have felt free to exert their Fourth Amendment rights and
refuse to consent to a search of their belongings.12 This was done even though other courts had
previously argued that “granting police the freedom to stop, interrogate, and search anyone who
consented would likely lead to racial and ethnic discrimination.”13 The expansion of similar
policies has led to expansive police stops and encounters for Black Americans (among other
racial and ethnic minorities), many for seemingly no reason.
The results of these policies were swift. Between 1980 and 2005, the number of annual
drug arrests more than tripled.14 By 1991, a quarter of young Black men were “under control of
the criminal justice system.”15 By 2007, one in every 31 adults was either in jail, on probation, or
on parole.16 The prison population rose from “350,000 to 2.3 million” within the last twenty five
years.17 Alexander highlights how quickly the War on Drugs hammered the Black community,
noting that “…when the War on Drugs gained full steam in the mid-1980s, prison admissions for
African Americans skyrocketed, nearly quadrupling in three years, and then increasing steadily
until it reached in 2000 a level more than twenty-six times the level in 1983.”18 A summation of
the relationship between Black Americans and the criminal justice system on Alexander’s
reading is as follows:
“This is the War on Drugs. The brutal stories described above are not isolated
incidents…In every state across our nation, African Americans – particularly in
the poorest neighborhoods – are subjected to tactics and practices that would
result in public outrage and scandal if committed in middle-class white
neighborhoods. In the drug war, the enemy is racially defined. The law
enforcement methods described…have been employed almost exclusively in poor
12
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communities of color, resulting in jaw-dropping numbers of African Americans
and Latinos filling our nation’s prisons and jails every year. We are told by drug
warriors that the enemy in this way is a thing – drugs – not a group of people, but
the facts prove otherwise.”19
The interpretation and evaluation of Black Americans by much of the law enforcement
community is that they are either about to commit a crime or just committed a crime, shown by
the disturbing disparities in arrests between Black and white Americans. Black Americans
appear to be evaluated by the criminal justice system as a group that requires additional policing
due to the assumption of certain activities taking place in Black communities, and harsher
punishments because of assumptions about the kind of people they are.

Section 3: Informal Institutional Respect
An example of less formal institutional respect directly affects the location in the realm of
moral rightholders for Black women: the cultural images of Black womanhood. These cultural
depictions of Black women proffer views of them as inferior because of their combination of
Blackness and womanhood and provide a framework for the mistreatment of Black women. I
will briefly summarize Patricia Hill Collins’ argument about the existence of controlling images
for Black women and two of the images of Black women she mentions – the “welfare queen”
and the “Jezebel.”
Collins contends that “intersecting oppressions of race, class, gender, and sexuality could
not continue without powerful ideological justifications for their existence.”20 Depicting Black
women as stereotypes help justify the oppression of Black women, as “these controlling images
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are designed to make racism, sexism, poverty, and other forms of social injustice appear to be
natural, normal, and inevitable parts of everyday life.”21 The images of the matriarch, the
mammy, welfare mother, and the Jezebel serve as means of othering Black women in America
by placing Black women on the inferior side of a number of theoretical binaries: fact/opinion,
Black/white, man/woman, subject/object.22 This is part of the function of a white supremacist
patriarchy – to dominate, exploit, and objectify those who stand at margins of society.
One might wonder how to connect the existence of these images to the
institutionalization of patterns of evaluation and interpretation regarding Black women. My
position is that the cultural maintenance of these images constitutes a form of institutionalizing
these patterns. On Collins’ view, the cultural maintenance of these images occurs via schools, the
news media, and government agencies, all of which are sites for reproducing these controlling
images.23 The rapidly growing sociocultural influence of television, radio, movies, music,
popular culture, and the Internet provide these images with a vehicle for their cultural
maintenance and space to continue to develop new versions of these images. As cultural products
that are able to be exported and commodified for political and economic gain, popular culture
has increasingly picked up on these images and distributed them as commodities for political and
cultural use.

3.1: Welfare Mothers and Jezebels
Collins situates the notion of the welfare mother within a post-Civil Rights historical
context. Following struggles by Black Americans to gain access to basic political protections
21
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(e.g., Social Security, unemployment benefits, antidiscrimination laws, minimum wage), the
image of the welfare mother arrived. It projects a change from the view of Black people as
simply cheap labor to Black people as a “costly threat to political and economic stability.” 24 The
welfare mother is portrayed as “being content to sit around and collect welfare, shunning work
and passing on her bad values to her offspring.”25 She is presented as a bad mother who is failing
at multiple levels of womanhood and civility – she has no money, no manners, and no man. The
phrase, “welfare queens,” is used to describe an unwed Black mother (often thought of as having
more than one child) who lives in government-subsidized housing and abuses the government
assistance system for income. Ronald Reagan introduced this image to the public during a 1976
campaign rally and while President, cut government spending on social welfare programs. As
Michelle Alexander explains, “The term ‘welfare queen’ became a not-so-subtle code for ‘lazy,
greedy, black ghetto mother.’”26 This was done while popular media blamed Black women for
the deterioration of American culture and economy.27 Collins sums up the popular culture and
policy based views of the welfare queen: “…the welfare queen constitutes a highly materialistic,
domineering, and manless working-class Black woman. Relying on the public dole, Black
welfare queens are content to take the hard-earned money of tax-paying Americans and remain
married to the state.”28 For a recent media depiction of Black women as welfare queens,
Mo’Nique’s 2009 Academy Award performance in Precious was an extreme version of the
welfare queen stereotype as Mary, an abusive mother who forces her family to pretend that they
are taking care of her grandchild with Down’s syndrome in order to gain additional welfare
benefits from the government (even though Mary’s mother was caring for the child).
24
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The image of the jezebel has had a revival as a controlling popular culture image within
the last few decades. The image of the jezebel, or sexually aggressive woman, originated in
slavery, operating as a rationale for the rampant sexual assaults by White men that Black slave
women experienced.29 On Collins’ account, this has morphed into controlling images of Black
women as sexually aggressive with different ways of displaying their aggression, including how
they dress, how they dance, and whom they sleep with.30 This image depicts Black women as
owners of an excessive sexual appetite, one that is a representation of deviant sexuality within
American culture. Black women have been assumed to be prostitutes when they are on dates
because of the cultural prevalence of this image. Contemporary rap music is filled with these
images, so much so that a depiction of Black women as a purely sexual object is a norm in the
genre. It is also in the same vein that the 2007 comments that Don Imus made towards the
Rutgers University women’s basketball team occurred, when he described those young women
as “nappy headed hoes,” rough and more masculine; and the women from the University of
Tennessee women’s basketball team as more feminine and “cuter.” He was noting that Black
women as sexual objects should comport themselves for (white) male visual consumption.
As the images of Black women show, being afforded institutional respect (the
institutionalization of the interpretation and evaluation of those images) placed them at the
margins of the realm of moral rightholders. As a result, the kind of treatment that Black women
receive is based on their evaluation by the relevant social institutions. This is often not the same
treatment in society as other social groups. Institutional respect is best understood as a social
relation of patterns of evaluation and interpretation that is established. This encompasses the
legal standard that Darby has championed in his articulation of institutional rights externalism, as
29
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well as other non-legal forms of institutional respect that can exist. To be able to possess a given
moral right, one must receive institutional respect by the relevant institution. Being
institutionally respected, however, does not guarantee that one is located at the center of the
realm of moral rightholders.

Section 4: Four Objections to Institutional Rights Externalism
Proposing rights externalism is offering a view that takes a radically different approach to
rights possession than the traditional view. There are four specific criticisms levied by supporters
of the traditional view against rights externalism. I will begin with what I take to be the weakest
of these objections and finish this section by addressing the strongest.
George Rainbolt, in The Concept of Rights, challenges the notion of a moral right as a
way of acting or being treated, which is the view held by Darby regarding the nature of rights.
He uses the example of X’s right that Y sticks his feet in a lake in New Hampshire after Y
promised X that he would do this. On the face of it, Y sticking his feet in the lake is not an action
that X takes, nor is it a behavior taken towards X. For Rainbolt, this is an action done that affects
Y’s feet and the lake. Since X’s right seems to be one that is neither a way of acting by X or a
way of behaving toward X, Rainbolt suggests that rights are not ways of acting or being
treated.31 This approach, however, assumes a narrow understanding of “treating one”; a broader
understanding of treating one would include keeping one’s promise. Rainbolt concedes that if an
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externalist makes this move, he would drop his objection as it would mean that they hold the
same view.32
Joel Feinberg offers a defense of natural rights as being able to allow individuals the
ability to claim. Victims of wrongdoing can make demands because they have a notion of rights,
and therefore what is due to them. If we adopted an externalist view, the resulting world would
be morally impoverished, where “we would not be able to justify complaining when wronged,
that we could not capture the distinction between acting wrongly and wronging someone, that we
would have no basis for respect for self or others, and perhaps most damning, that we could not
effectively argue against social practices such as slavery.”33 Returning to the case of the slave,
Feinberg argues that the slave has a complaint, but without any power to affect her master’s
duties or her own, she is not entitled to complain since she will not have a “genuine moral
grievance.”34 This provokes the question of when one has a genuine moral grievance, as it cannot
simply be because one is entitled to complain, as that would be a circular definition. Nor can it
be because of the existence of pre-social rights as that would be question begging.35 Darby
proposes one way of understanding Feinberg’s genuine moral grievance: “an individual has a
basis to complain when and only when recognition of her claim is called for by moral principles
or the “principles of an enlightened conscience.”36 This could be further understood as having a
basis to complain when others cannot ignore the complaint, without performing a moral wrong,
or when one would be morally justified in complaining.37 One need not assume pre-social moral
rights as the way to explain why it is wrong to ignore an individual with a basis to complain, as
32
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there are other moral concepts that can do this work, such as duty, utility, or virtue.38 As a result,
although people in a world without natural rights cannot appeal to those rights, they are no worse
off provided they have additional moral tools to ground their complaints.
What does not seem obvious within Darby’s work is what kind of respect is meant when
he discusses institutional respect, as one could loosely understand it as the acceptance of
whatever socially ratified practices the institution are maintaining and enforcing. He does,
however, draw on Stephen Darwall’s recognition-respect as a way to defend externalism against
the claim that persons will not be able to have self-respect because there is a necessary
connection between being an object of respect and being a prospective claim-maker.39 That use
aside, I do think recognition-respect maps onto the use of respect Darby suggests when he refers
to institutional respect. Recognition-respect is “a disposition to weigh appropriately in one’s
deliberations some feature of the thing in question and to act accordingly.”40 Given Darby’s
understanding of institutional respect being the social ratification of social practices, recognitionrespect seems to map onto his view. Ratified social practices that are relevant to the object of
recognition are a feature of that object, insofar as they inform the object of recognition’s location
in the realm of moral rightholders, which regulates conduct towards that object. While I would
not consider Darby directly drawing from this view so much so that one should reformulate
institutional respect as institutional recognition-respect, Darwall’s recognition-respect does an
adequate job of being a well-known understanding of respect that can point towards the concept
at play in institutional respect.
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A final issue is how to understand social misrecognition within this framework. One fair
interpretation of institutional rights externalism is that there is no such thing as social
misrecognition – one is never actually socially misrecognized, just socially recognized in ways
that place people in different locations in the realm of moral rightholders. I am sympathetic to
this understanding. This, of course, does not capture the essence of being socially misrecognized,
as it ignores how different the experiences of different people are based precisely on how they
are socially recognized. That is not to say that this interpretation is inaccurate, as. It is difficult to
consider receiving institutional respect as being socially misrecognized; being institutionally
respected is to be socially recognized, which determines one’s resulting placement in the realm
of moral rightholders. Social misrecognition, on my account, is a claim that the institutionalized
patterns of evaluation and interpretation are inaccurate, misleading, harmful, or outright false.
Social misrecognition happens when a subject makes a claim about the problems with the
patterns of their interpretation. This retains the essential element of the notion of social
misrecognition – that there is something wrong with how a subject is socially recognized – while
still remaining honest about the differing moral conditions that stem from that process of social
recognition.

Closing Remarks: Conceptual Issues and Analysis with Rights
Externalism
Darby’s account of rights externalism has explanatory force because of its ability to make
sense of the social realities of the world. He conceived this view as a way to engage in political
philosophy while taking race and racism seriously as a real feature of American society.41 On his
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view, it should not be surprising that, for example, Black slaves in the antebellum South were
routinely treated in disturbingly cruel ways – the legal institution of slavery formally ratified
certain social practices, such as the rape and murder of Black people. That it can accurately
describe the realities of the world does not mean that there are not unresolved practical and
theoretical questions that come from this account. Here are three that I will address in Chapter 3.
One issue to address is the use of institutional respect as the measure of social
recognition. Given the literature available on recognition, it is reasonable to wonder how
prominent recognition scholars like Axel Honneth or Nancy Fraser could assist in explicitly
showing the importance of social recognition. Additionally, this view needs to be able to account
for the violation of rights, including those violated by the state. Lastly, a purported strength of
institutional rights externalism is its ability to map onto the lived experience of Black Americans
in a pragmatic way, which requires providing supporting pragmatic principles.
After responding to these issues, I will provide an institutional right externalism based
analysis of Black Americans possessing the right to rectification and receiving rectificatory
justice.
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Chapter 3: Applying Institutional Rights Externalism to Rectificatory
Justice for Black Americans

In Chapters 1 and 2, I argued that claims for Black reparations are better understood as
claims of rectificatory justice that stem from a moral right to rectification and that institutional
rights externalism establishes both a practical and theoretical link between social recognition and
moral rights possession. That was the initial step to develop my claim that how Black Americans
are socially recognized directly impacts their ability to gain rectificatory justice. The next step is
to apply this framework for moral rights possession to the issue of Black Americans and their
moral right to rectification given the evidence presented in Chapters 1 and 2. Before I can do
this, however, there are three theoretical issues that might seem to undermine any such
application.
First, a purported strength of this view is its ability to map onto the lived experience of
Black people in America while accounting for the disputes surrounding their claims of moral
rights possession by adding social recognition as a necessary condition for moral rights
possession. By theorizing about moral rights possession from the lived experiences of people,
Darby refers to his account as pragmatic in that it can describe both the conditions for
participation in the realm of moral rights-holders as well as offer insights into what needs to
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change for the excluded to be able to participate in that realm.1 But two questions challenge this
claim:
(1) Darby does not provide an argument about the significance of social
recognition to people and groups, basing his argument on an assumption that
social recognition is important to people in a significant way. Can an explanation
be provided about the importance of social recognition in the world in such a way
that it supports the use of social recognition as a central concept within
institutional rights externalism?
(2) Although Darby considers his theory to be pragmatic, what, if any, pragmatic
principles undergird institutional rights externalism?
In the first sections of this chapter, I respond to these questions. However, doing so requires
expanding Darby’s account and in some cases revising his argument to respond to these issues.
In answering (1), I argue that Honneth and Fraser provide at least two answers of why social
recognition is important. Regarding (2), I argue that Black pragmatists, particularly visionary
pragmatists, share foundational principles with institutional rights externalism, providing a
justification for considering it a pragmatic theory.
Second, how should we account for rights violations by the institutions that are supposed
to enforce or protect those very same rights, such as the state? The policing practices mentioned
by Alexander suggest that the criminal justice system is able to violate rights and protect rights,
creating a potential problem for establishing rights that are social realities because of fickle
institutions.2 In section three, I answer this question. My position is that it is not inconceivable
that institutions both protect rights and are capable of violating them, either through
representatives of the institution itself or by the policies and culture of the institution. I use the
institution of law enforcement as an example of this distinction.
1
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The final question is one of application, given the evidence laid out in Chapters 1 and 2:
do Black Americans currently possess a moral right to rectification within a framework of
institutional rights externalism? On my analysis, even though there is a morally valid claim that
should invoke a right to rectification, how Black Americans are socially recognized erodes their
ability to possess a right to rectification.

Section 1: Social Recognition within Institutional Rights Externalism
One general way of understanding social recognition is that to be socially recognized is to
be “seen” in some relevant manner by the relevant society. What it means for society to
recognize someone, or what it means to be “seen,” differs from society to society. Institutional
rights externalism offers a method of what it means to be “seen.” It is to be shown institutional
respect, which is to be afforded a location in the sphere of moral rightholders with the sorts of
rights that a subject possesses being determined by institutionalized patterns of interpretation and
evaluation. This makes social recognition an institutionalized social relation, not a psychological
state.
The importance of social recognition is assumed in adopting this view. It does not strike
me as a problematic statement to claim that being recognized by the social world one lives in has
tremendous value for people.3 But how should we understand what is meant by valuable to
people? Based on the work of two prominent recognition theorists, there are at least two ways to
understand this value: it could be valuable for the development of the individual within a society,
or it could be valuable for the development of a society.
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The recognition theorists who offer these views are Axel Honneth and Nancy Fraser.
Honneth’s tripartite conception of recognition offers an explanation for the importance of social
recognition for the development of the person – being appropriately recognized allows one to
receive self-love, self-esteem, and self-respect. Fraser’s distinction between recognition based on
identity and recognition based on material conditions shows how different understandings of
social recognition have a direct effect on conceptualizing how to respond to problems in society.
Although both theorists articulate the importance of social recognition for people in the world,
neither’s work accurately maps onto the way that I am conceptualizing social recognition. A
theory of social recognition that is applicable for institutional rights externalism must satisfy a
necessary and sufficient condition: it must be able to address the historical context of racism and
non-ideal social conditions in America as part of its theory. In the following section, I will
explain why this is so. Following that, I will summarize the views on recognition of both
Honneth and Fraser and argue that neither satisfies this condition based on theoretical
background assumptions within their work.

1.1: Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Theory of Social Recognition
Let us call the necessary and sufficient condition for applicability of a theory of social
recognition within an American institutional rights externalist context the “Applicability
Condition.” The condition is that it must be able to address the historical context of racism and
non-ideal social conditions in America. Darby has clearly stated that part of his aim in defending
rights externalism is its use for describing the moral conditions that Black Americans face. To be
able to do that requires beginning to theorize from non-ideal conditions, rather than ideal
conditions. Understanding the moral conditions of Black Americans cannot be done without
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explicitly accepting the historical context of racism in American society, which is certainly one
case of non-ideal conditions. In taking this view, I am sympathetic to Charles Mills’ position in
“Ideal Theory as Ideology,” where he offers an account of the vices of using ideal theory as a
normative ethical strategy.
“I refer to the distinction between idealizing and non-idealizing approaches to
ethical theory, and the endorsement of the latter. I will argue that this normative
strategy has the virtue of being potentially universality in its application – able to
address many, if not all, of the concerns not only of women, but also of those,
men as well as women, subordinated by class, race, and the underdevelopment of
the “South” – and reflecting the distinctive experience of the oppressed while
avoiding particularism and relativism. Moreover, in certain respects it engages
with mainstream ethics on what are nominally its own terms, thereby (at least in
theory) making it somewhat harder to ignore and marginalize.”4
Taking an ideal model to understand the workings of a phenomenon hinges on the ideals that a
given theorist chooses, often done with a “reliance on idealization to the exclusion, or at least
marginalization, of the actual…ideal theory either tacitly represents the actual as a simple
deviation from the ideal, not worth theorizing in its own right, or claims that starting from the
ideal is at least the best way of realizing it.”5 On Mills’ view, doing ideal theory often includes a
steady silence on oppression, whether historic or current, which ignores the effects of systemic
oppression on social institutions within their theories.6 This is untenable for any theory of social
recognition that attempts to fit within institutional rights externalism. Or as Mills puts it, “How
in God’s name could anybody think that this is the appropriate way to do ethics?”7
Starting from non-ideal conditions is a necessary condition for theories of social
recognition within an institutional rights externalist framework because without requiring non4
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ideal conditions as background considerations, there is little reason to connect moral rights
possession to social recognition. Ideal conditions operate as a background theoretical assumption
for internalist views of moral rights possession. Theorizing from the starting point of ideal
conditions lends itself towards ignoring the importance of social recognition in moral rights
possession. As a result, if a theory of recognition fails to meet this condition then it will not be
useful for institutional rights externalism.

1.2: Honneth and the Importance of Recognition for the Self
Axel Honneth offered an account of recognition that directly connects why a lack of
recognition constitutes a moral harm based on his understanding of the individual as both a
moral agent and subject as situated within society. Honneth stressed the importance of social
relationships as part of the development and maintenance of a person’s identity. He argues that
full human flourishing is contingent upon the existence of certain kinds of relations. The
existence of these relations requires a “struggle for recognition,” a conflict-ridden process in
which people endeavor to gain their due recognition. It is through this intersubjective process
that people are able to create the necessary grounds for the possibility of forming their own
identity. This account of human agency grounds one’s ability to be an moral subject and agent in
the responsiveness to others with respect to three modes of recognition – “care for one’s needs
and emotions, respect for one’s moral and legal dignity, and esteem for one’s social
achievements.”8 Absent being recognized within each mode, one cannot develop practical
relations to the self that are vital for becoming a moral subject and agent. On Honneth’s view,
these non-instrumental relations of recognition are a necessary constitutive condition for being a
8
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moral subject and having moral agency.9 These conditions form the basis for what he calls the
“formal conception of ethical life,” a normative ideal in which patterns of recognition allow
people to develop the necessary self-confidence, self-respect, and self-esteem for the
development of their identities.10
Honneth’s work on both the struggles for recognition and the formal conception of
ethical life combine to yield a normative tool for analysis of the morality of the social world.
Building on early Hegelian views on intersubjectivity and G.H. Mead’s social psychological
account of the individual lets Honneth focus his account on the recognition needed to develop
into a moral subject and agent. On Mead’s account, a process of gradually moving to a
“generalized me” takes place over the course of one’s development as a child, since the frame of
reference of one’s self-image will gradually expand as their circle of interaction partners
expands.11 Honneth takes cues from this view of identity-formation, noting that the first step for
understanding a morality of recognition lies in accepting that moral injuries are possible as a
result of the interconnectivity of human life. “It is not merely bodily pain as such, but the
accompanying consciousness of not being recognized in one’s own self-understanding that
constitutes moral injury…it is the disrespect of personal integrity that transforms an action or
utterance into a moral injury.”12 That people are subject to moral vulnerability follows from the
notion that the positive development of one’s identity is only possible through affirmative
reactions from other people. In instances of moral injuries, one’s positive relation-to-self is
disregarded and the more fundamental the type of self-relation being disregarded, the more
9
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serious the moral injury.13 On his account, the experience of injustice offers a phenomenological
lens for examining in what manner one has been misrecognized. To bolster this view, he notes
that disrespect does harm to one’s practical relation-to-self because it is not an affirming practice
within the scope of mutual recognition.14

1.3: Honneth’s Three Modes of Recognition
Three types of interactions correspond to different patterns of recognition on Honneth’s
view. He categorizes one’s practical relations-to-self as beginning from the person relating to
herself from her most immediate needs and desires. Having elementary certainty about these
needs and their value is having self-confidence or self-love.15 The next stage of practical
relation-to-self is a person being aware that she is morally accountable for her actions; having
certainty about the value of her judgment is having self-respect.16 The last stage in developing
practical relations-to-self is being aware that one has laudable capabilities; having certainty in
the value of those capabilities is having self-worth or self-esteem.17 This developmental view of
relations-to-self accords with Mead’s work, as our practical relation-to-self, much like one’s selfimage, is tethered to interactions with others. There are three independent modes in which one
can be recognized that impact how one develops and how one is treated as a moral agent and
subject: love, respect, and esteem. These are “socially sanctioned principles that circumscribe
what should count as adequate recognition of members of society.”18 Being adequately
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recognized allows one to develop practical relations to the self in each mode of recognition, since
it is viewing one’s self “from the normative perspective of one’s partners in interaction, as their
social addressee.”19 Importantly, these modes combine to form the ground for a moral point of
view, one in which moral agents and subjects recognize other moral agents because they all share
in a common integrity that is based on persons receiving their due recognition to be able to
flourish.
The first mode of recognition is love, which allows one to receive the practical relationto-self of self-love or self-confidence. He explains this primarily through the developmental
relationship between a child and her primary caregiver, as the relationship between a caregiver
and his child is one where the child’s needs and desires are uniquely valued by the caregiver in
such a way that the underlying principle is similar to unconditional devotion.20 On Honneth’s
account, this relationship can be understood as “…a struggle for recognition that involves the
negotiation of, or continual exchange between, ego-relatedness and boundary dissolution…”21
As the child and caregiver grow with each other, there is a break when the child recognizes that
the caregiver cannot always be at his disposal and the caregiver realizes that the child is going to
be independent of her. In that instance, a negotiation takes place that establishes a relation-to-self
of self-confidence, which he considers “both conceptually and genetically prior to every other
form of reciprocal recognition.”22 This struggle includes gaining independence from the
caregiver while still being emotionally attached to her. Love as a mode of recognition operates
through affirmations of one’s self-confidence. It is not a synchronic process, however.
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Developing basic self-confidence is a diachronic activity that is driven by the affective
relationships in a person’s life.
The second mode of recognition is respect, which leads to the practical relation-to-self of
self-respect. His main principles for grounding this view are a Kantian view of the subject as a
morally responsible agent; and his idea that legal systems of rights perform the service of
acknowledging each person as morally culpable for their actions. The character of this mode of
recognition is universal equal treatment since each person operates as an agent with the capacity
for rational autonomy. People are equal in that they should be held accountable for their actions.
Moral accountability is also the grounds for respecting other people since we all share this
feature in common. He considers moral responsibility to be the "respect-worthy core of the
person," suggesting that people deserve respect for being the kinds of beings that can be held
accountable for their actions.23 It is because of the rational autonomy that humans possess that
people who break laws should receive punishment - they used their ability to reason to determine
that they should act against the law. The more pressing connection that he makes is that to be a
bearer of rights is to be worthy of respect. For Honneth, the relationship between respect and
rights is "stronger than an 'association': respect and rights are conceptually and practically
inextricable."24 Since we are responsible for our actions, people should also receive individual
rights. In a political sense, having a system of individual rights is how respect as a mode of
recognition is actualized. By individual rights, he is referring to legal rights, but respect as a
mode of recognition is inherently reciprocal. These rights are due to persons as a way to protect
the freedom they have to use rationality to determine their life choices. The thrust of his claim is
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simple: respect can only be shown by treating someone as a person with legal rights. As a result,
where there are no rights, there can be no respect.25
The last mode of recognition is esteem, which allows one to receive the practical relation
to self of self-esteem. The intersubjective nature of personal identity leads Honneth to recognize
that people are dependent on the esteem that they receive from others.26 While respect is due to
all persons in virtue of their ability to be morally responsible for their actions, esteem is granted
on the basis of an individual's particular characteristics.27 Another way of thinking about this is
to consider each person to have a set of talents, skills, or characteristics that are unique to that
person, and it is in virtue of possessing those unique qualities that a person should receive esteem
from her community. On Honneth's view, esteem often comes from the contributions made to
society in the form of labor.28 It is important to note the distinction between esteem and respect
for Honneth, as they are easily considered connected. He explains that there was a historical
decoupling of legal recognition and social esteem, which were often combined to be understood
as social respect.29 Since legal recognition is based on the mutual equality of all persons as
morally responsible agents, it cannot admit of degrees. Esteem is based on the worth of an
individual based on their achievements and the degree to which society values those
achievements.30 Honneth's main claim is that esteem is granted if one's traits and abilities are
aligned with society's values.31 There are two important conditions to this claim: everyone in
society should have an equal chance at earning esteem, but nobody has an automatic right to be
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granted esteem.32 He does believe that modern societies have endured enough of a pluralization
of values that allow for people have a chance to be esteemed, however esteem is not equally
distributed amongst people.

1.4: Honneth on Disrespect
Being disrespected or considered unworthy of respect has three places in his theory: first,
Honneth considers disrespect to be either misrecognition or denial of recognition. When one fails
to respect another person, the person not being respected is not afforded the same level of moral
responsibility as others and can have their autonomy restricted.33 Denials of recognition as
disrespect would include groups like children and the elderly, groups that are considered to have
justifiably limited autonomy. Misrecognition, for Honneth, focuses on wrongful treatment, such
as insults or humiliation, because it “injures [people] with regard to the positive understanding of
themselves that they have acquired intersubjectively.”34 Second, being disrespected takes on
different forms and comes in different degrees (having one’s legal rights denied is often not the
same as receiving an insult) but he uses his tripartite distinction as a way of understanding how
disrespect does harm to a subject. Physical abuse, which harms one’s physical integrity and selfconfidence; the denial of rights, which harms one’s self-respect; and being socially devalued,
which harms one’s self-esteem.35 Lastly, it is the experience of disrespect that allows the person
being disrespected to understand that she is being denied her dignity in such a way that it harms
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her by cutting into her humanity.36 This is consistent with his view that intersubjective
recognition is constitutive of one’s humanity in such a way that to be denied one's dignity is to
have part of, if not all of, one's humanity denied.

1.5: Fraser’s Recognition as Redistribution
Nancy Fraser offers a view of recognition that focuses on material redistribution as a
necessary part of recognition as opposed to how it impacts personal identity development.
Noting the development of injustice being discussed along cultural lines, Fraser is concerned that
both misdistribution and cultural injustice receive their due and that the misdistribution side is
being lost. Part of her view is a critique of theorists like Taylor and particularly Honneth that are
focusing entirely on the cultural injustice side of the matter, as though “either (1) we no longer
have reason to be concerned with economic injustice, (2) cultural injustice is more important
than economic injustice, or (3) cultural injustice provides significant leverage by itself to attack
the structures of power that produce economic injustice.”37 She dismisses the identity model that
Honneth suggests, one where “recognition of identity is justified, since otherwise people would
be psychologically damaged and/or unable to achieve self-realization.”38 Her main point is that
recognition, while certainly important, does not overtake the issue of distributive justice. Noting
that contemporary struggles for recognition happen within a context of cultural domination, she
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thinks this approach misses a more crucial aspect of the situation - the gross material inequality
in which these cultural struggles exist.39

1.6: Fraser’s Importance on Both Redistribution and Recognition
Within a framework of personal identity formation, struggles for cultural recognition
seem to be the appropriate measure, as it allows for one to gain their self-worth in some manner.
Fraser takes this to be the wrong approach if it subsumes the issue of distributive justice in the
pursuit of cultural recognition. Taking recognition to be part of a larger issue of justice, she
proposes that justice requires recognition and redistribution and that it is only through this
combination can happen.40 Seeing recognition and redistribution as two distinct spheres, she
considers the latter as the primary space for challenging issues of cultural domination. She
recognizes that socioeconomic and cultural injustices are, practically speaking, intertwined.41 For
her account, she splits them into two analytically distinct issues that have two distinct responses:
redistribution for the former and recognition for the latter. Recognition claims seek to address the
re-valorizing and affirmation of some group, whereas redistribution claims seek to end economic
arrangements that target specific groups to that group’s detriment. This presents a dilemma – for
many groups, they will require both redistribution as well as recognition in order to be able to
overcome the combination of material and cultural injustice but those two kinds of claims can
interfere with each other or undermine each other. “People who are subject to both cultural
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injustice and economic injustice need both recognition and redistribution. They need both to
claim and to deny their specificity.”42

1.7: Redistribution, Recognition, and Marginalized Groups
Considering how wide the scope for marginalization is for different kinds of marginalized
groups, such as various types of people of color and members of the LGBTQ community, it is
difficult to parse out understanding these groups as solely political-economic or cultural.43 Were
gender or race considered just part of the political-economic sphere, then they would solely help
structure the political economy of society and responding to that issue will attend to the
economic division of labor. Were they considered just part of the cultural sphere, they would
solely be cultural markers with corresponding values and responding to that issue will attend to
the re-valorization of those cultural markers.
Consider the example of gender. Gender injustice at the economic level includes the
division of labor between largely female unpaid domestic labor and largely male paid labor,
higher paid male dominated fields and lower paid female dominated fields, and the gender wage
gap between men and women in the same field.44 Remedying these gender-specific injustices
would require ending the gender division of labor across the board. This is not the only way in
which gender injustice occurs. The cultural devaluation of women includes sexism that manifests
itself in many ways, such as:
“the pervasive devaluation and disparagement of things coded as “feminine,”
paradigmatically – but not only – women…including sexual assault, sexual
42
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exploitation, and pervasive domestic violence; trivializing, objectifying, and
demeaning stereotypical depictions in the media; harassment and disparagement
in all spheres of everyday life; subjection to androcentric norms in relation to
which women appear lesser or deviant and that work to disadvantage them, even
in the absence of any intention to discriminate; attitudinal discrimination;
exclusion or marginalization in public spheres and deliberative bodies; and denial
of full legal rights and equal protections. These harms are injustices of
recognition.”45
Addressing these issues requires the re-valuing writ large of women, one in which
women are properly recognized as equal members of society as demonstrated through cultural
expressions, legal expressions, and social practices. This would include “decentering
androcentric norms” as well as male privilege.46 To fully remedy gender injustice would require
a change in political economy and culture, changes that stem from different claims for group
acknowledgement or the end of group acknowledgement. A similar line can be drawn for race
and how to overcome corresponding issues of racial discrimination. In either case, Fraser’s
dilemma seems to be made even more acute between recognition and redistribution.
Her response is to highlight the differences between two approaches to remedying
injustice – transformative and affirmative. Affirmative solutions are those that are “aimed at
correcting inequitable outcomes of social arrangements without disturbing the underlying
framework that generates them.”47 Transformative solutions are “aimed at correcting inequitable
outcomes precisely by restructuring the underlying generative framework.”48 In applying the
transformative and affirmative approaches to the redistribution and recognition models of justice,
Fraser constructs a matrix by which four different permutations exist. The modern liberal welfare
state is an example of affirmative redistribution. Multiculturalism is an example of affirmative
45
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recognition. Both have the goal of providing surface reallocations for specific groups, which
supports group differentiation.49 Socialism and deconstructive politics are examples of
transformative remedies, as their goals are to destabilize the underlying systems of group
differentiation that have led to untenable cultural or economic ills.50
On her account, affirmative redistribution remedies such as public assistance programs
for the poor can generate a backlash for the groups who receive redistribution, while
transformative remedies have the possibility of addressing misrecognition. “Affirmative
redistribution can stigmatize the disadvantaged, adding the insult of misrecognition to the injury
of deprivation. Transformative redistribution, in contrast, can promote solidarity, helping to
redress some forms of misrecognition.”51 Using gender and race as examples, she notes that the
set of four remedies can be paired as means of addressing injustice. The pairings are most fruitful
when both components share a similar approach to groups, whether promoting or destabilizing
group differentiation. Fraser concludes that the pairing of transformative remedies has the most
promise for two reasons: first, “…our best efforts to redress these injustices by means of the
combination of the liberal welfare state plus mainstream multiculturalism are generating perverse
effects,”52 and second, they work to interrupt the underlying frameworks that cause the need for
redistribution or recognition practices.53 “In this context, the project of transforming the deep
structures of both political economy and culture appears to be the overarching programmatic
orientation capable of doing justice to all current struggles against injustice. It alone does not
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assume a zero-sum game.”54 Ultimately, Fraser would rather not trade off the potential for
material gains in order to receive cultural gains, but the ideal she is striving for is one where the
economically and culturally marginalized no longer suffer under those conditions of injustice.

1.8: Strengths and Weaknesses of Using Fraser and Honneth
Both projects do an admirable job of explaining the real world consequences attached to
social recognition, both for the individual and in how people advocate for changes in their
society. In doing so, they demonstrate the profundity of recognition within society. Their ability
to explain this importance provokes an additional consideration: why not use Honneth or Fraser
in developing the institutional respect model of social recognition? My position is that although
these projects can explain why social recognition is important, they both fail to meet the
“Applicability Condition” that I set forth earlier. What follows are critiques of both Honneth and
Fraser’s positions, as well as why they fail to meet the “Applicability Condition.”
Although Honneth understands recognition as a central mode operating in society, that
proper recognition manifests as love, respect, and esteem ignores how the lived experiences of
the oppressed changes how they interpret what it is to receive proper recognition due to
experiences of misrecognition. Avishai Margalit’s work on misrecognition and humiliation
serves as a different way of achieving Honneth’s goals of recognition while taking an approach
to the politics of recognition that is informed by the lived experiences of members of society
rather than idealized positions.
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Rather than focusing on a lack of love, respect, or rights, Margalit approaches
misrecognition through a lens of humiliation. By placing humiliation at the center of
misrecognition, what it means for one to receive their due recognition is simply “not to be
humiliated.”55 Rather than aiming for a just society, Margalit argues that it is preferable to have a
decent society: “A decent society is one that fights conditions which constitute a justification for
its dependents to consider themselves humiliated. A society is decent if its institutions do not act
in ways that give the people under their authority sound reasons to consider themselves
humiliated.”56
Honneth's view on the politics of recognition is that justice, equality, and freedom
combine to lay the groundwork for normative politics, which is where he and Margalit have a
sharp disagreement. Margalit notes that it is much clearer to determine what counts as
humiliation than what counts as respecting someone, and that it is that humiliation that lays the
groundwork for normative politics.
“I believe that it is not justice that brings us into normative politics, but injustice.
Not equality, but inequality. Not freedom, but despotism, and more to the point –
not recognition and respect, but rejection and humiliation. There is, on my
account, more urgency to dealing with humiliation than dealing with recognition
and respect. Moreover, it is much clearer what counts as humiliation, namely
treating humans as non-humans – e.g. as animals, as instruments, as mere
statistics, as sub-humans – than what counts as respecting them.”57
That Honneth’s theory does not start from non-ideal conditions provides grounds for it to fail to
meet the “Applicability Condition” of being able to satisfactorily address the historical context of
racism in America. The idealization of three spheres of recognition seems to fall prey to the
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criticisms of ideal theory from Mills; the promotion of the ideal is done at the expense of the
actual. Although Honneth’s work on disrespect is more closely aligned with theorizing from nonideal conditions, his account of recognition is based on the ideal development of the individual.
Fraser’s view is situated in changing the status quo rather than adopting additive
measures that promulgate the same system. Her view is not without critique, as both Larry Blum
and Iris Marion Young have commented that her position starts from an unrealistic one – that the
politics of recognition profoundly outweigh the socioeconomic problems of modern society.
Blum argues that she ignores the recognition of difference while trying to respond to those who
she claims have ignored the recognition of material inequality. As such, he claims that Fraser’s
account lacks a key point – why the need for recognition is distinct from the need to be seen as
an equal.58 He noted that the target groups Fraser chose (race, gender, sexual orientation) are all
already devalued groups that, in part, want not to be devalued. “…racial groups are often also
ethno-cultural groups and, as such, are concerned not only to be seen as equal human beings, but
also that their distinct culture be recognized within the larger cultural/social sphere.”59 Young
shared a similar critique, that feminist and anti-racist activists are not ignoring economic issues
in their pursuits of improvement for their communities.60 More importantly, she does not see the
dilemma Fraser posits as a result of actual political strategies but as a result of the abstract
framework she offered.61 Finally, Simon Thompson notes that her strategy to change cultural
values to deconstruct current systems of identity seems reasonable. However, she makes an
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appeal to the legal rights of citizens as a way for people to change their cultural values and
recognize their common humanity. On Thompson’s view, this process does not seem possible.
“However, it sounds very odd to say that it is also possible to modify cultural
values in order to recognize ‘our common humanity’ by, for example,
guaranteeing ‘the full rights and equal protections of citizenship.’ The problem is
that instantiating a right is not just a matter of modifying cultural values; nor is it
the purpose of such a right to end cultural disparagement. Rather, to instantiate a
right is to create a legal guarantee backed by the force of the state, and its purpose
is to provide a power or protection for the holder of that right...even if there were
a sufficiently equal distribution of resources, and a status order in which no
individuals or groups were significantly disparaged, some individuals might still
not be able to participate on a par with their fellows if their basic civil and
political rights were not protected.”62
That Fraser would expect that the guarantee of legal rights and citizenship would allow people to
recognize common humanity seems to suggest that the instantiation of de jure equal rights as
citizens also instantiates de facto protection of those rights, a position that Charles Mills has
suggested is unreasonable.63
This criticism suggests that Fraser’s account does not satisfy the “Applicability
Condition.” A cursory glance at history suggests that a theoretical move of de jure recognition to
de facto recognition does not accord with the lived experience of Black Americans. The Civil
Rights Movement of the mid-20th Century perhaps exemplifies this, as without the public
pressure placed by Black and white Americans on Congress and the White House to act on
behalf of Black Americans, there would have been no de jure changes made by the various Civil
Rights Acts and anti-discrimination legislation. Additionally, Young’s criticism of Fraser’s
framing of the dilemma suggests that Fraser is utilizing ideal theory at the expense of non-ideal
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theory in order to establish that dilemma. Lastly, Linda Martin Alcoff argued that Fraser is too
critical of identity politics, so much so that she ignores how central identity is to being able to
have full participation in society.6465
Even though both give a strong articulation to the value of social recognition within
moral and political theory, neither is necessarily applicable to the development of a theory of
social recognition for institutional rights externalism.

Section 2: Pragmatic Methodological Principles in Institutional Rights
Externalism
One of the strengths of institutional rights externalism, according to Darby, is that it can
map onto the lived experience of marginalized and oppressed groups, like Black women. In
taking this stance, institutional rights externalism presents itself as a non-ideal theory of moral
rights possession, one that Darby suggests that we understand as pragmatic.66 In this section, I
will explain the pragmatic methodological principles within institutional rights externalism.

2.1: The Basic Pragmatic Methodological Principle
What follows is a basic description of pragmatism. Pragmatism centers human experience
as the basis for theory rather than theory as the basis for evaluating human experience. For
pragmatists, theorizing is a human activity that is informed by the historical and cultural context
that the theorist lives in. The socially and culturally constructed nature of the world is accepted
64
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rather than challenged in the service of promoting an ideal to be matched. Ideals themselves can
exist within a pragmatic framework but they are secondary in theoretical development to the
actual human practices and behaviors that are taking place. This isn’t a suggestion in favor of
pragmatism as relativism, as that is not the case. But it is a suggestion that to begin to both
theorize and ultimately address concrete problems of the world, pragmatists think of the ideals
they wish to achieve as concrete and do so by attuning their ideals with the lived experience of
relevant human communities. Put succinctly, “The various dimensions of human experience are,
in pragmatism, the roots of all of human life, including human intellectual life.”67
John Dewey is a key historical figure in American pragmatism. His work has been
foundational for the considerations of Black pragmatists. His description of pragmatism included
a focus on the use of pragmatism in ethical and social theory. “Moral and social problems, for
Dewey, are concerned with the guidance of human action to the achievement of socially defined
ends that are productive of a satisfying life for individuals within the social context.”68
A basic description of pragmatism as well as Dewey’s use for pragmatic thought suggests
that institutional rights externalism’s focus on the role of the social world in moral rights
possession means it adheres to at least one pragmatic methodological principle. The ideals of
institutional rights externalism, such as being able to address the moral conditions of the
marginalized and oppressed, are those that are directly relevant to the lived experience of human
communities. Additionally, it adheres to this principle because institutional rights externalism
greatly respects the cultural context of social and intellectual phenomena as part of its theoretical
coherence. Traditional theories of moral rights possession rely on a universal knowledge of
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rights possession by certain subjects existing prior to society. This is another salient difference
between traditional theories of moral rights possession and institutional rights externalism.

2.2: The Black Pragmatic Methodological Principle
I will use the work of Eddie Glaude, Cornel West, and Denise James to explain how there
is a specifically Black pragmatic methodological principle in the formulation of institutional
rights externalism as both Darby and I conceive of it.
Glaude introduces Blackness into pragmatism through use of tragedy. Glaude describes a
pragmatic view of tragedy as follows: “[It] is one in which any situation properly called moral
entails competing and conflicting values…We learn from tragedy that crude reductions of the
complexity of our moral lives can lead to an exclusive attachment to one value and disregard for
another.”69 Using the work of Toni Morrison’s Beloved, Glaude paints a picture of the decisions
made by Black Americans during slavery and following Emancipation as often filled with
tragedy due to the seemingly inevitable humiliations and dangers surrounding Black life.70 As a
result, the pragmatist recognizes her humanity as part of her approach to decision making.
“We seek to secure our world, then, not by quests for certainty but rather by
practical means, exposing our vulnerability as fragile, finite creatures to the perils
of evil. To render Dewey’s philosophy of action in sloganlike form: There is so
much in the world that we cannot control. We should seek to control intelligently
that which we can, bearing in mind that even when we succeed, the hazardous
character of our world is only modestly modified, never eliminated.”71
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The goal is not eliminating the problems of the world entirely but addressing the problems that
we can reasonably control in as intelligent a manner as possible. For Glaude, part of being able
to address problems intelligently is being historically informed about those problems. The past is
effectively a chronicle of past human actions, rationales for those actions, and the consequences
from those actions. Through aligning the past actions with the present ideals, Glaude’s Black
pragmatism uses tragedy as fuel for acting to prevent tragedies. “By countering immodest claims
of America’s greatness and inevitable triumph with the brutal reality of broken black bodies and
souls, that past, in all of its complicated beauty, humbly orients us to the world of action.”72
Cornel West has crafted a form of pragmatism known as prophetic pragmatism.73 Built
on the importance of tragedy, West considers human suffering as a constitutive aspect of
humanity – something that classical pragmatists like Dewey failed to capture.74 Built with West’s
Christian faith and requiring a notion of evil, the methodology of prophetic pragmatism is to
locate the middle ground between the possibilities of human progress amidst the impossibility of
human utopia.75 “Prophetic pragmatism is a form of tragic thought in that it confronts candidly
individual and collective experiences of evil in individuals and institutions – with little
expectation of ridding the world of all evil.”76 This reveals the importance of human struggle
within prophetic pragmatism, as finding that middle ground provides strategies for combatting
the problems of the world in the finite ways that people have control over.
“Human struggle sits at the center of prophetic pragmatism, a struggle guided by a
democratic and libertarian vision, sustained by moral courage and existential
72
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integrity, and tempered by the recognition of human finitude and frailty. It calls
for utopian energies and tragic actions, energies and actions that yield permanent
and perennial revolutionary, rebellious, and reformist strategies that oppose the
status quos of our day. These strategies are never to become ends-in-themselves,
but rather to remain mean through which are channeled moral outrage and human
desperation in the face of prevailing forms of evil in human societies and human
lives. Such outrage must never cease, and such desperation will never disappear,
yet without revolutionary, rebellious, and reformist strategies, credible and
effective opposition wanes. Prophetic pragmatism attempts to keep alive the sense
of alternative ways of life and of struggle based on the best of the past. In this
sense, prophetic pragmatism is tragic action with revolutionary intent, usually
reformist consequences, and always visionary outlook.”77
Again, the importance of tragic action is taken as the hook for Black pragmatism, with West
noting that the rationale behind tragic actions is to improve the concrete lives of people in the
world as much as possible while articulating a new ideal to reach. His view, however, rests upon
a belief in the transcendent to sustain one through the struggle, a view that some may find
constraining as the method to sustain the struggle.
Denise James tracks the legacy of Black pragmatism, noting that Black feminist thinkers
have contributions to this discourse that explore additional ways of understanding Black
pragmatism. In particular, the visionary pragmatist approach championed by Stanlie James and
Abena Busia uses a methodology of focusing “on the possibilities inherent in our current
political situations, rather than the tragic elements of that experience that has preoccupied West
and others.”78 Although the tragedy that informs Glaude and West’s approach to pragmatism are
historically grounding and relevant for framing how to respond, visionary pragmatism prioritizes
the potential of the present over the tragedies of the past by centering the experiences of Black
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women at present. Stanlie James and Busia use “visionary pragmatism” to describe the practical
and theoretical methods of Black feminists.
“Black feminists are simultaneously envisioning incremental changes and radical
transformations not only within Black communities but throughout the broader
society as well. Ultimately, the humanistic visionary pragmatism of theorizing by
Black Feminist seeks the establishment of just societies where human rights are
implemented with respect and dignity even as the world’s resources are equitably
distributed in ways that encourage individual autonomy and development.”79
Denise James notes that Patricia Hill Collins also adopts the language of visionary pragmatism in
describing the Black women in her community as a child. They wanted to both provide Collins
with hope while also preparing her for a hostile world that often changes at glacial speeds.80 This
clarifying view of visionary pragmatism acknowledges the significant difficulties that are in the
world, the past conditions that inform those difficulties, and that the method is to constantly
struggle toward increasing human flourishing.
“…although Black women’s visionary pragmatism points to a vision, it doesn’t
prescribe a fixed end point of a universal truth. One never arrives but constantly
strives. At the same time, by stressing the pragmatic, it reveals how current
actions are part of some larger, more meaningful struggle…Actions bring people
in touch with the humanity of other struggles by demonstrating that truthful and
ethical visions for community cannot be separated from pragmatic struggles on
their behalf.”81
Whether through a focus on the tragic or through a focus on the struggle, Black pragmatism
offers a central methodological principle to follow – it must be accurately informed about the
historical context and lived experience of Black Americans. The Black pragmatic principle of the
importance of being historically informed accords with the aforementioned “Applicability
79
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Condition.” This condition is posited because of the explicitly historically informed nature of
Darby’s paradigmatic example, Black slaves in America, as well as my goal of identifying what
is preventing rectifying injustices committed against Black Americans. In either case, building
responses to these questions requires having a well-informed historical context of Black people
in America. This is a central methodological principle for Black pragmatists working in an
American context, and institutional rights externalism adheres to it.

Section 3: Rights Violations and Institutional Rights Externalism
Michael Monahan has a concern about Darby’s institutional rights externalism that is
pressing for the present discussion. His concern is how Darby’s theory can account for the
violation of rights by an institution such as the state. What follows is a brief summary of his
concern about institutions as perpetrators of violation of rights.

3.1: Monahan’s Challenge
Monahan considers Rights, Race, and Recognition to be an “engaging and stimulating
exploration of meta-ethical questions regarding moral rights…”82 Being sympathetic to the
approach and Darby’s use of rights discourse in the pursuit for racial justice, Monahan offers a
critique of the view that seems particularly problematic – how to account for institutions such as
the state violating a subject’s rights in a view where an institution like the state is ultimately
supposed to guarantee the force of those rights. Recall from Chapter 1 that having moral rights
on an institutional rights externalist framework requires being shown institutional respect, which
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is having a way of acting or being treated socially ratified. The social ratification must be done
by the relevant institutions of a society, those who are able to convert ways of acting or being
treated into a right. For Monahan, this yields a paradox of sorts. If the state is one of those
relevant institutions that can ratify ways of acting or being treated into rights, then it seems
incoherent that Black slaves, for instance, had their rights violated.83
“The externalist account makes it rather difficult to make sense out of the
violation of rights by political institutions, however. If rights are a matter of both
having formal “institutional recognition” of a practice or set of practices and
having those practices actively maintained and enforced, then it seems impossible
to account for the violation of rights by that institution or set of institutions
responsible for that maintenance and protection…when the institution or set of
institutions (in most cases, the state) responsible for enforcement and maintenance
fails to act upon that responsibility, then one of the necessary conditions for my
status as a conventional rightholder no longer obtains.”84
The result of this view is that the state might remove a subject’s rights, which means that these
rights do not exist. Where rights do not exist, they cannot be violated. As such, a violation of
rights that are dependent upon the state for their enforcement and maintenance cannot occur
simultaneously.85 For Monahan, this means that Darby would have to say that Black slaves did
not have their rights violated. Monahan’s reading is compatible with institutional rights
externalism insofar as it takes seriously that rights require something beyond a valid argument to
justify their existence. But it does suggest a challenge to Darby’s account – how does it account
for institutions denying or violating the rights of those whose rights it is expected to uphold or
protect?
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3.2: Responses to Monahan
A working definition of an intentional violation of a right and an intentional denial of a
right should prove useful. I focus on intentional violations and denials because of the intentional
nature of a multitude of different rights violations and denials that have occurred to Black
Americans.86 Intentionally violating a right refers to a set of actions that conflict with a right;
intentionally denying a right refers to possessing a set of beliefs that contradict the justification
of a right. This distinction allows that one can violate a right without necessarily denying that
right as well as deny a right without necessarily violating it. Denying a right, however, does
mean that one considers the actions of violating that right as morally permissible since there is
not a right to be respected. In drawing this distinction between actions and beliefs, I am not
intending to make or defend any claims regarding the interconnected nature of belief and action.
This is a distinction being drawn in order to establish a categorical difference between violating a
right and denying a right.
One response to Monahan regarding the case of Black slaves is that they had rights
within smaller communities but not the larger political community. A result of this view is that
Black slaves were not considered full members of the realm of moral rightholders that included
the larger political community. For the case of legal rights and Black slaves, this limits legal
rights possession until the establishment of the 13th, 14th and 15th Amendments. Even though this
limits claims on possessions of legal rights, Monahan notes that Darby’s goal is still to use the
language of rights, since “the rhetoric of rights still enables one to mount a critique based on the
slave’s lack of rights, if not on the violation of those rights…but such rights will not exist until
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such time as they are formally recognized, enforced, and maintained by the state.”87 Darby uses
appeals to moral justifications as well as Black slaves’ existence as full moral rightholders in less
formal arenas as a way to use rights discourse to critique the moral status of Black slaves in the
antebellum South.
While perhaps unsatisfying, it is also consistent with institutional rights externalism. By
acknowledging that Black slaves did not have moral rights in formal arenas but did have them in
less formal arenas (e.g., the family), Black slaves did not have their rights violated by the state
but can still be considered moral rightholders in some sense. Since some less formal institutions
can produce the relevant social recognition required for moral rights possession, there is still
recourse for morally critiquing the conditions that Black slaves experienced. This ability to offer
moral critique in the absence of rights was pragmatically useful for changing how Black slaves
were socially recognized in the larger political community. That allowed Black slaves to
eventually become considered members of the realm of moral rightholders.

3.3: Law Enforcement as a Rights Upholding and Rights Violating
Institution
Law enforcement agencies are an interesting example of an institution that is operated by
the state. They recognize and uphold rights while also being capable of violating the same rights
that they recognize and uphold. So long as there are authorities that can bring that institution to
account for that violation, the right itself is still socially ratified. The history of racialized police
violence in America suggests that the institution upholds rights when it does its duty and violates
those same rights when it commits undue harm to those it is supposed to protect. Two scenes
87
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from the award winning film, Crash, depict the ability of police to both violate rights and uphold
rights. In an opening scene, two Los Angeles police officers pull over a Black couple in a black
SUV, even though one officer notes that the car does not fit the description from their report.
After asking them to exit the car, the other officer gropes the Black woman under the guise of
searching her. In a later scene, the same officer rescued the woman who he groped from a
burning vehicle. While fictional, it offers a point for this discussion: there is a difference between
the institution itself violating rights, reflected by the policy and the culture of the institution, and
institutional representatives who violate rights, which is a matter of personal choices, which may
be supported by either the policy or the culture of the institution.
For an institution like law enforcement, one endowed with the power to legally violate
the rights of citizens, my view is that representatives of that institution violating rights is
tantamount to the institution itself violating rights. Law enforcement officials have the ability to
violate citizens’ rights because the institution of law enforcement has been granted with the
coercive power of the state. The culture of law enforcement and its lack of generating
accountability for police officers who violate rights inform the choices made by individual police
officers and departments. Larry May noted that people do not take actions without considering
the social ramifications of their behavior. “Furthermore, individual action rarely, if ever, takes
place in a moral vacuum. There are many social factors that make a particular action more likely
to occur; indeed, action in the world is as much a function of groups as of individuals.”88
Ferguson, MO, was sued by the United States Department of Justice for its unconstitutional law
enforcement policies, alleging that the Ferguson Police Department had a pattern of law
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enforcement that violated the 1st, 4th, and 14th Amendments.89 The existence of the Department of
Justice as a check on institutions that violate rights provides an institutional authority that
socially ratifies the rights violated by the institutions under its purview by being able to bring
them to account for their actions. The case of law enforcement agencies provides a context for
understanding how an institution can both protect and violate the same set of rights.
Having addressed three significant hurdles towards being able to use institutional rights
externalism as an applicable framework for analyzing the moral conditions of Black Americans,
the following section provides an analysis of the ability of Black Americans to possess a moral
right to rectification.

Section 4: Application and Analysis of Black Americans and the Right to
Rectification
Rodney Roberts argues that a dominant conception of Black Americans as inferior is a
plausible constraint on Black Americans possessing a moral right to rectification. Roberts creates
a set of necessary criteria that establish how likely that rectificatory justice occurs for a minority
group that has been unjustly harmed. First, there must be a “prevailing sense of injustice by the
dominant group toward the group in question,”90 and second, “the dominant group’s conception
of the group in question must be such that the group is believed to be deserving of
rectification.”91 One could grant that the first criterion has been satisfied even if there is a large
segment of the dominant group that does not feel the same sense of injustice. The second
criterion has not been satisfied in the Black American case (compared to Japanese Americans,
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who received both compensation and an apology for their internment during World War II), and
given the painful history of the Black experience in America, an explanation is necessary for
why Black Americans are not perceived as deserving of rectificatory justice.92 Roberts uses the
Inferior Rectificatory Status Thesis (IRST) to explain this absence – the ascription of a prima
facie inferior status to one group by the dominant group provides an understanding of that group
as undeserving of rectificatory justice.93 Two possible explanations that ground the prima facie
inferior status are the perception of Black Americans as repeatedly failing to achieve economic
and political success; and America’s particularly virulent anti-Black racism.94
My framing of institutional rights externalism provides a third possible explanation for
the Inferior Rectificatory Status Thesis, one that can include both of Roberts’ possible
explanations. The institutionalized patterns of interpretation and evaluation about the present
condition and overall history of the Black experience allows for the prima facie ascription of an
inferior rectificatory status for Black Americans. These patterns are quite possibly informed by
all of the following conditions simultaneously (and more): anti-Black racism; negative
perceptions of Black Americans and their ability to gain economic and political success;
stereotypes about Black American culture and its values; and implicit anti-Black bias. Recall
that, on my view, moral rights possession comes as a result of morally valid claims that are
socially recognized, and that showing institutional respect is the process of social recognition
required to turn a morally valid claim into a social reality. Debates about rectifying anti-Black
injustice rarely turn on whether or not injustices occurred that are worth rectifying. The
constraint does not appear to be whether the claims themselves are morally valid. The constraint
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is the existence of institutionalized evaluative and interpretive patterns that do not socially ratify
claims for rectifying anti-Black injustice. Although morally valid, these claims have had little
uptake by American institutions to be able to turn them into social realities, perhaps exemplified
by Congressman John Conyers’ annual introduction from 1989 until 2018 of a bill to address and
analyze claims for Black reparations never receiving genuine debate.95
The conclusion of my analysis is simple: the claim for rectifying injustices committed
against Black Americans is morally valid. This suggests that Black Americans should possess a
moral right to rectification, and in fact do possess this right provided that their claim for
rectifying injustices is institutionally respected. Unfortunately, due to the institutional evaluative
and interpretive patterns of both Black Americans as a group subject and their claim for
rectifying injustice, the claim is not socially ratified. The institutional patterns allow for a prima
facie understanding of Black Americans as undeserving of having anti-Black injustices rectified.
Not having the appropriate institutionalized patterns of interpretation and evaluation regarding a
claim for rectificatory justice satisfies the Inferior Rectificatory Status Thesis, which explains
why Black Americans do not possess a moral right to rectification. How Black Americans are
socially recognized prevents them from possessing this right.

Closing Remarks: Upshots From My Analysis
Although this conclusion seems disconcerting, it is at the very least accurate in that it
offers a concrete explanation for why Black Americans have not had injustices committed
against them rectified while acknowledging that the claim for the right to rectification is morally
valid. It also recognizes that this morally valid claim is not socially recognized – which is to say,
95
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that it has not been socially ratified by the relevant authorities, nor become part of an
institutionalized pattern of interpretation and evaluation. Ultimately, this theory rests on the
pragmatic assumption that the rights that one possesses are the rights that one can use. How
Black Americans are socially recognized informs the rights that are ascribed to them, such as a
moral right to rectification.
The saving grace of a theory of moral rights possession that is informed by social
recognition is that processes of social recognition are not fixed. How a subject is socially
recognized is not set in stone. This means that with the appropriate changes in how Black
Americans are socially recognized, it is possible for Black Americans to gain the right to
rectification and ultimately receive rectificatory justice.
There are a number of different potential upshots from this conclusion, and the latter half
of this project will address two questions in particular: first, how does my account differ from a
view within Black scholarship that Black Americans have already exercised their right to
rectification and as such, should not currently possess a right to rectification? Second, and most
importantly, what can be done to change how Black Americans are socially recognized in order
to ultimately gain rectificatory justice? I respond to these issues in the following two chapters.
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Chapter 4: Black Conservatives on Rectificatory Justice – “Justice Gained”
and “Pathological Blackness”

In the first three chapters, I argued that possession of a group moral right to rectification
for Black Americans is eroded due to the way in which they are socially recognized within
American institutions. A question looms over this understanding: is it possible that Black
Americans have already received rectification and as such, have no grounds to make legitimate
claims to a right to rectification? I recognize that many of these arguments have happened in
mainstream academic spaces, but I want to focus the relevant arguments in this discussion on
conservative Black scholars who argue that contemporary Black Americans have no legitimate
claims for rectificatory justice because Black Americans have had their injustices rectified. I do
this because the intra-racial debate appears to have more far-reaching consequences for the
application of my view. If there is a strong case made by Black scholars that Black Americans
should not presently receive rectificatory justice for the injustices they have endured, it is
possible that my position misses something important about injustice as part of the Black
experience in America, as understood by Black people in America. Even though non-Black
scholars have provided accounts to explain what they take to be the practical and theoretical
limitations for rectifying injustices committed against Black Americans, I take the more pressing
concerns about my position to be challenges that come from those who have also been victims of
anti-Black injustice.1
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Black conservatives2 would agree that Black Americans do not currently possess a right
to rectification for the injustices they have endured. They might also agree that Black Americans
do not possess that right because of how they are socially recognized. Where we have significant
disagreement, however, is on why Black Americans are socially recognized the ways that they
are and whether they should possess a right to rectification. Black conservative thinkers, such as
Shelby Steele, Thomas Sowell, John McWhorter, Justice Clarence Thomas, and Armstrong
Williams, are a minority group in the academic and political arenas of Black America. This is in
spite of the fact that Black Americans are politically diverse, with nearly an even split between
those who identify as liberal and conservative.3 This makes sense, as there are elements of
conservative thought that are ideologically accepted by much of the Black community. Ideas like
self-reliance, independence, and an embrace of capitalism are commonly accepted ideals among
Black Americans.
Although Black Americans have a diversity of social and political views, they have been
a consistent voting block within the Democratic Party for generations. Polling since 1972 in
presidential elections consistently shows the infrequency of Black Americans voting for
conservative representatives in government.4 A recent study examined the disparity between the
overwhelmingly Democratic voting patterns among Black Americans and the diversity in their
political identification. It suggested that a reason for such loyalty to the Democratic Party stems
from a desire for a more activist government rather than a small government, and because of an
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importance of in-group identity.5 These suggested reasons are supported by sharp dividing lines
between Black conservatives and the majority of Black American academics and politicians.
Viewing conservative political policies as transformative for the Black community is one
dividing line between Black conservatives and other Black Americans, as conservatives prefer
less government intervention rather than government activism. Another is the often-disparaging
views of Black culture and the Black community offered by Black conservatives, deriding the
values associated with Black American culture as morally bankrupt and socially corrosive. This
suggests that Black conservatives consider their in-group identity as Black but do not carry the
same level of importance regarding their group identity, allowing them to disparage the character
of the group without disparaging themselves.
The goal for this chapter is to show the salient differences between my position and the
Black conservative position, and I do this for two reasons: first, it shows three major theoretical
distinctions between my position and the Black conservative position regarding the enduring
nature of anti-Black injustice, the demands of rectificatory justice, and whether Black Americans
should possess a right to rectification; and because a goal of this chapter is to defend my position
from being conflated with or considered in support of the argument that Black conservatives
have regarding the rectification of anti-Black injustice so that it can be used in the development
of solutions for anti-Black injustice.
To do this, I will first explain what I refer to by Black conservative thought and lay out
common theoretical tenets of Black conservatives. Following that, I will discuss two connected
Black conservative arguments about Black Americans receiving rectificatory justice. The first
argument, which I call the “Justice Gained” argument, posits that relevant changes in the
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structure of society, including a general disavowal of explicit displays of anti-Black racism and
legal changes that protect Black Americans from racial discrimination as well as provide
additional access to opportunities, have rectified the injustices that Black Americans endured.
The second argument, which I call the “Pathological Blackness” argument, takes the “Justice
Gained” argument to be true and draws two conclusions from it: first, that Black Americans do
not possess a right to rectification because the demands of rectificatory justice have been
discharged; and the contemporary existence of racial inequality is a problem created and
sustained by the values associated with Black culture. I will then critique these arguments
regarding their ability to support the notion that rectificatory justice has been gained by Black
Americans based on the model of rectificatory justice I have previously endorsed.

Section 1: Black American Conservatism
Black conservatives have played an active role in Black social, cultural, and political
traditions throughout American history, such as Jupiter Hammon, Booker T. Washington, Eileen
Garner, Congresswoman Mia Love, and former Secretaries of State Colin Powell and
Condoleezza Rice. An example of how motivating Black conservatives have been is the desire
that Marcus Garvey had to come to the United States to work with Booker T. Washington, the
leading Black conservative of his era (note Washington’s Niagara Convention speech), but
Washington died before Garvey could make the trip.6 According to Angela Lewis, many Black
theorists believe the origins of Black conservatism are a result of slavery and racism, which left
free Black people little choice but to prefer the status quo conservatism, a decision that allowed
them to maintain their social positions and offer a model for other for achieving the same social
6
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status.7 This intra-racial class distinction, originally between free and slave and currently
between the Black middle class and the poor, is one that could produce two groups advocating
for very different public policies.8 The preferred policies for those who hold traditional
conservative values include limited government, preservation of life, liberty, and property,
promoting capitalism and the free market as the best methods of meeting the needs of society,
possessing a strong work ethic, traditional family value systems, and most importantly, the
individual as the central political unit in society.9
“To conservatives, the most fundamental of all the dominant American value
systems is individualism. The individual has a centripetal role in the universe of
the American political economy. However, this is tied to the belief that human
beings are competitive higher animals in nature. That is, for individuals to sustain
themselves and attain socioecononomic progress, they must engage in the process
of competition and self-fulfillment. Inalienable rights to life and liberty, the
sanctities of private property, and freedom to dissent are all important tenets for
the conservative notion of individualism.”10
Black conservatives adopt conservative values as means to address problems within the
Black community. For them, western civilization and the universality of its institutions provide
Black Americans with the freedom they need to be able to live out their version of the good life.
“In ideal terms, black conservatives argue that the American system is set up to treat everyone
equally and that everyone has an equal opportunity for success, that it does not matter what
efforts are made to discriminate, they are futile because this is America.”11 This is not to say that
Black conservatives are a monolith, much as mainstream American conservatives are not a
monolith. Some are primarily social conservatives, often members of the religious Far Right or
7
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groups such as the Nation of Islam; most Black conservative scholars are neoconservatives who
are against government expansion and support school voucher initiatives and the importance of
the family. There are a number of versions of Black conservativism, as one would find stark
differences in the policies prescribed by Colin Powell, Louis Farrakhan, and Glenn Loury. While
I acknowledge the diversity of Black conservative thought, the version of Black conservatism
that I will be discussing is the set of commonly prescribed principles by contemporary Black
neoconservative academics and politicians.

1.1: Fundamental Black Conservative Principles
Deborah Toler has explicated five central tenets of Black conservatism:
“1. Although lingering racism still exists, thanks to the victories of the civil rights
struggles, racial discrimination is no longer a critical obstacle to black progress.
We can speak of a racist American past, but not of a racist contemporary
America.
2. African American demands for equal opportunity made during the civil rights
era now go too far in demanding equal outcomes. A non-discriminatory America
does not ensure equal outcomes. Capitalism maximizes skill and talent and any
differences among ethnic groups, or between genders, is a function of each
group's particular strengths and weaknesses.
3. Today's problems of race relations and black poverty cannot be remedied by
government policy alone. The roots of today's problems are located first and
foremost within African Americans: in our inability to successfully compete in a
free market system, in the poor values and irresponsible and offensive behavior of
poor blacks, in our psychological hang-ups about group identity and past
victimization, and/or in our failure to take full advantage of existing opportunities.
In this light, not only are government social welfare and legal remedies, such as
affirmative action programs, unnecessary, they are detrimental to the development
of black people. Social welfare programs destroy black families, foster
debilitating dependency, and reward irresponsible behavior.
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4. Affirmative action programs lower black self-esteem since whites will always
diminish black accomplishment as reflecting only affirmative action imperatives
and black beneficiaries of affirmative action programs can never be fully
confident that their success stems from their talent. These programs are also
detrimental to blacks because of the white (male) resentment they engender.
Affirmative action has, in any case, only benefited more advantaged blacks.
5. The appropriate strategy for African Americans is one focusing on self-help.
First we need to de-emphasize racial identity and loyalty in favor of an American
identity. Second, African Americans should compete on the basis of merit only.
Third, we need to de-emphasize government programs and civil rights legislation
in favor of racial self-help. Blacks need to focus on black entrepreneurship,
building and supporting black business, particularly in poor black neighborhoods.
And most important, the black middle-class needs to teach poor African
Americans appropriate values and behavior.”12
It is not necessary to agree with all of these tenets to identify as a Black conservative, but these
are different points of entry into Black conservatism. Individual achievement and racial group
self-improvement are the keys to success in America for Black people, not government
assistance. Self-help, a strong character, and hard work have been and will continue to be the
successful method for achieving the desired equality Black people long for. Rather than insisting
upon the historical racist stigma attached to Black Americans, Black Americans should look
inward to improve their own life outcomes, since reliance on government programs only
precipitates economic underachievement, moral laziness, and apathy towards middle-class
values. Preferential treatment programs, which some Black conservatives initially favored, are no
longer useful after the social and especially legal changes made in the mid and late 20th Century.
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1.2: Affirmative Action, Reparations, and Victimhood – An Overview
An aspect to Black conservativism that has come to the forefront since the 1990s is the
steadfast refusal of social or political policies that promote a “victimhood” status to Black
Americans. Those who argue that racism is preventing them from living their best lives are
adopting a victim mindset. A “victim” worldview allows Black Americans to avoid taking
responsibility for the failings of their community and offer a narrative that subpar performance
within the Black community stems from “suffering and deprivation.”13 This would include
policies that advance preferential treatment programs, such as affirmative action, as well as
reparations (and I assume other rectificatory measures) for Black Americans. “Victimologist
thinking infuses almost all discussions of education with the assumption that ‘black’ means
‘poor,’ and that the dismal school performance of black youngsters is the product of inequities in
school resources, racism among teachers, and chaotic home lives.”14
Affirmative action policies have outlived their usefulness, as “racial representation does
not mean racial development,” and it has negative effects on the psyche of Black Americans,
leaving a specter of self-doubt regarding the merits of their educational or employment
opportunities.15 Shelby Steele succinctly explains this concept of self-doubt. “Under affirmative
action, the quality that earns us preferential treatment is an implied inferiority. However this
inferiority is explained – and it is easily enough explained by the myriad deprivations that grew
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out of our oppression – it is still inferiority. There are explanations, and then there is the fact.”16
Continuing about this theme, he notes: “Victimization, like implied inferiority, is what justifies
preference, so that to receive the benefits of preferential treatment one must, to some extent,
become invested in the view of one’s self as a victim. In this way, affirmative action nurtures a
victim-focused identity in blacks.”17
According to Armstrong Williams, arguing for reparations “encourages minorities to
believe that they are really lost souls.”18 This form of racial stereotyping ultimately renders
Black skin as indicative of a presumed “damaged goods” status. It is offensive to the
individualistic sensibilities of the Black conservative because it ignores personal responsibility,
the merit and talents of the individual, and the moral compass each person possess. “Simply to
regard all members of a group as victims neatly removes such terms as ‘character’ and ‘personal
responsibility’ from the cultural dialogue. After all, what need is there for individual striving
when it is plainly understood that all the difficulties that blacks suffer are the direct indisputable
result of incidents that occurred centuries ago.”19 Taking up this victimhood status ignores the
social, economic, and legal progress that has been made by individual Black Americans as well
as by the nation itself that has allowed for significant improvement in the status of Black
Americans since prior to World War II. It is also self-limiting, as Shelby Steele claims that
victimhood prevents Black Americans from taking self-interested actions to improve themselves.
“It is at the point of taking self-interested action in the American mainstream that
all the unresolved wounds of oppression manifest themselves and become a wall.
Here is where inferiority anxiety, a victim-focused identity, that peculiar mix of
16
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personal and racial self-doubt, fear of failure, and even self-hate all combine to
make for a fear of self-interested action. And without such action, there can only
be despair and inertia.”20
Given the views of conservative Black Americans, it is unsurprising that they are antireparations, as it would support a victimhood mindset. They do acknowledge the existence of
economic, educational, and various other social gaps between Black and white Americans.
However, the existence of these gaps cannot be explained through forms of structural oppression
because systemic anti-Black injustice has been addressed primarily through legal changes.
Arguing for rectificatory justice becomes moot, since the introduction of civil rights legislation
and anti-discrimination legislation resolved the core problems surrounding anti-Black injustice.
For Black conservatives, the unjust situation that belied Black Americans was their explicit lack
of legal protections for generations. Once legal rights had been administered to Black
Americans, the responsibility for achievement fell on the shoulders of each individual to become
their best possible self. This ethos grounds their current response to the various plights of Black
America, one that promotes individual efforts to join mainstream America and reinforces
personal responsibility. This is summed up by Steele considering that “the highest challenge of
‘blackness’” should be personal development.21

Section 2: The “Justice Gained” Argument against Black Rectificatory
Justice
Black conservative views regarding rectificatory justice for Black Americans can be
distilled into two specific arguments. The first is that Black Americans have already received
rectificatory justice because of primarily legal changes as well as social changes. The second is
20
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that Black Americans have no right to rectification because they are responsible for their own
contemporary social plight due to a pervasively pathological culture of resisting mainstream
middle class values, valuing underachievement, and promoting government reliance.
The “Justice Gained” argument has this form:
1) Black Americans faced systemic racial injustice within the system of chattel slavery,
which continued after emancipation through legalized injustice, such as Jim Crow laws
and lack of public goods and services provided to Black Americans.
2) Black Americans meaningfully possessing legal rights and equality of opportunity are
both necessary and sufficient to end systemic racial injustice against Black Americans, as
the rule of law governs both individuals and institutions.
3) Systemic racial injustice against Black Americans can be considered rectified once there
are changes in the legal apparatuses of society to affirmatively recognize the racial
equality of Black Americans and affirm all of their due rights as citizens.
4) Civil rights and anti-discrimination legislation as well as affirmative action policies are
legal changes that affirm the citizenship rights and racial equality of Black Americans.
5) Therefore, racial injustice against Black Americans has been rectified.

2.1: The Merits of “Justice Gained”
A rough sketch of the “Justice Gained” argument using the work of John McWhorter is
what follows. McWhorter argues that racism is not the same institutional phenomenon it used to
be. Individual bad actors exist but their existence is not indicative of the existence of social,
political, or cultural anti-Black animus. Historical American racism towards African-Americans
is just that – history. Racism is not so easily found in contemporary America, McWhorter asserts,
because America has generally turned the corner. “…our proper concern is not whether racism
still exists, but whether it remains a serious problem. The election of Obama proved, as nothing
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else could have, that it no longer does.”22 The applicability of a concept like institutional racism
is weak because of the documented progress of both American society as well as Black
Americans in general. “Journalists, academics, community leaders, concerned citizens, NPR
listeners – all must break the habit of supposing it is our moral duty to keep racism front and
center in discussions about how to help disadvantaged black people. Because in 2009, that’s all it
is – a habit.”23
Most importantly, McWhorter argues that the legal protections enacted to support Black
Americans’ ability to have equal access to opportunities and full access to their rights as citizens
is the same thing as reparations. He argues that these efforts are reparatory in nature since they
are designed to improve to social, political, or economic standing of Black Americans. As a
result, Black Americans have already received rectificatory justice.
“They’re not called ‘reparations,’ of course, but that’s just an issue of
terminology. Affirmative Action has been reparations; the 1977 Community
Reinvestment Act battling redlining was reparations; the original intent of No
Child Left Behind was to identify disparities between black and other children in
scholarly achievement and therefore qualified by definition as reparations; in the
late 1960s, nationwide, at the behest of the National Welfare Rights Organization
and other movements, welfare programs were reformed to make payments easier
to get. This, too, was a form of reparations.”24
The “Justice Gained” argument has its merits. Racism does not manifest itself in
contemporary society in the same visceral ways it had only a few decades ago. Perpetual fear of
bodily harm by white strangers while knowing that no legal repercussions are coming for the
perpetrators is not at the same levels as it was prior to civil rights legislation. For a “Justice
Gained” defender, this could be attributed to the addition of hate crime statutes, a legal change
22
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that both recognizes the existence of persons who endeavor to harm Black people (and other
minorities) as well as punishes them more severely for committing that offense. There are more
Black people currently serving in political office than at any time in American history, possible
through the federal government’s intervention to protect voting rights as well as generations of
Black Americans utilizing their voting rights. Affirmative action has given many Black
Americans access to educational and employment opportunities that had been purposefully kept
away from them.
Although the “Justice Gained” argument is primarily based on changes in the legal
structures of society, it can also be supported by changes in the social structures of society
regarding how Black Americans are socially recognized.25 Overt or public displays of racism are
widely admonished and those who commit them often maligned and ostracized. Scandals in
recent years involving high profile public figures and racist actions or language demonstrate how
such behavior can damage someone’s reputation and livelihood. Michael Richards’ racist tirade
in response to a Black heckler effectively ended his career. Donald Sterling telling his girlfriend
that he did not want her associating with Black men in public at Los Angeles Clippers games
resulted in his ownership stake in the sports team being revoked by the NBA. Paula Deen and
Hulk Hogan suffered public humiliation and lost business opportunities as a result of their racist
language and behavior. Congressman Steve King, after inferring that white supremacy does not
have to be considered problematic, was condemned by both Republicans and Democrats and
removed from all of his congressional committees.
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Castigations of racist language and behavior are not limited to high profile public figures,
as viral incidents of racism during the daily lives of Black children and adults in America have
resulted in many people losing their jobs, as companies and schools do not wish to be associated
with public displays of racism by its employees. The public rightly condemns calling those who
call the police on Black people for doing mundane, everyday actions, such as barbecuing at the
park, taking one’s time golfing, performing a property inspection, moving into one’s apartment,
leaving an Airbnb rental, sleeping in a common room at a college dormitory, shopping for prom
outfits at an outlet mall, or sitting in Starbucks. In no uncertain terms, society has made marked
changes regarding the public response to overt displays of racism and its general level of
tolerance of racist behavior as part of American culture. Historically, this makes sense – a
significant change that helped galvanize national support for civil rights legislation in the 1960s
was the public dissemination of the images of Black men, women, and children being sprayed
with water hoses, chased by dogs, and beaten mercilessly by police. It is one thing to hear stories
about wrongdoing that has no direct bearing on one’s community in a segregated society. It is
quite another to witness atrocities being committed in one’s country on the front page of the
newspapers and as the leading headline for the evening news broadcast.
American society does not enjoy public displays of ugliness, since it broadcasts the
imperfections of the American experiment and does not extoll its virtues of fairness, justice, and
equality. To put it another way, America does not like its dirty laundry aired in public, and will
publicly condemn those who threaten to reveal the presence of racism and racial injustice. Even
if the motivations for offering condemnation are rooted in social self-preservation or maintaining
the appearance of holding certain virtues, these are social changes that mark a significant
departure from the status quo from only a few generations ago. Between the combination of
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social changes to end overt displays of racism and legal changes to end racial discrimination
against Black Americans, it may appear that rectificatory justice has already been provided for
Black Americans. Indeed, those who support the “Justice Gained” argument ultimately conclude
that the rectificatory measures that have been undertaken are both necessary and sufficient for
having rectified anti-Black injustice.

Section 3: The “Pathological Blackness” Argument against Black
Rectificatory Justice
The “Pathological Blackness” argument has this form:
1) “Justice Gained” is valid.
2) Racial inequality still exists even though rectificatory justice has been gained.
3) This can either be the cause of continued systemic racial injustice or some other cause
internal to the Black community.
4) Systemic racial injustice was eradicated after America met the necessary and sufficient
conditions of protecting Black Americans’ legal rights and supporting equality of
opportunity through legislation, so it cannot be systemic racial injustice as the root cause
for contemporary racial inequality.
5) This means there must be an internal cause for racial inequality, and this cause must
explain both the material conditions of Black Americans and their reasoning that led
them to these material conditions.
6) Black culture is this cause, as it reinforces the notion that part of being Black in America
is to resist the mainstream and rely on the government for solutions to racial inequality.
7) The mainstream (e.g., middle class social and economic values like self-reliance, hard
work, education, family planning) is the pathway to success in America.
8) As a result, the pathology of Black culture is one that prevents Black Americans from
taking responsibility for their own plight and they have no current right to rectification.
A rough sketch of how Black conservatives argue the “Pathological Blackness” position can be
found in the work of McWhorter and Steele.
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3.1: The Merits of “Pathological Blackness”
McWhorter argues that racial socioeconomic gaps have not closed because of a pervasive
pathology within the Black community that rebels against anything remotely white, including
middle class values. These values include waiting until marriage to have children (or at least
being financially capable of taking care of children), using education as a springboard to success,
and respecting authority. He argued that the failing of Black culture to promote education as
important for a successful life has been more of a problem than the existence of racism for Black
Americans. “Why do black students continue to perform below standards even in affluent,
enlightened settings where all efforts are made to help them? The chief cause is not racism,
inadequate school funding, class status, parental education level, or any other commonly cited
factor, but a variety of anti-intellectualism that plagues the black community.”26 He has attacked
the notion of “acting white” by doing well in school or speaking properly, describing it as an
exemplar for the problematic pathology permeating Black American culture.
“After slavery, blacks in America were brutally relegated to the margins of
society and allowed, at best, only the most woefully inadequate education.
Generation after generation of African Americans thus lived and died in a cultural
context in which books and learning were actively withheld. The ways of thinking
that are necessary to scholastic success came to be classified as alien or ‘other’ –
an idea powerfully reinforced by the separatist mindset of recent decades.”27
The separatist approach, for McWhorter is another example of the pathology that prevents Black
Americans from breaking the trope of victimhood. Purposefully avoiding an integrationist model
has done little to help develop the Black community and inculcated it with values that are
anathema to values that have a track record of success in American society. Steele notes this,
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saying: “Today, 70 percent of all black children are born out of wedlock. Sixty-eight percent of
all violent crime is committed by blacks, most often against other blacks. Sixty percent of black
fourth-graders cannot read at grade level…The above statistics come from [a] crippling sense of
entitlement than from racism.”28
For McWhorter and Steele, the entitlement that Steele mentions comes as a result of
unnecessarily prolonging the existence of preferential treatment programs, such as affirmative
action. McWhorter has argued that affirmative action may still have relevance in the business
world because merit is not the sole measurement of a good job candidate (one’s social network
and social skills often play a significant role in these matters), but that it has no place within
education because of the reduction of the incentive to excel, and because it will make it clear that
Black students are freely competing with all students rather than benefitting from a racial
advantage in their evaluation.29 Steele argues that affirmative action has outstayed its welcome
by making racial representation the goal instead of racial self-improvement, noting that “…it
leaps over the hard business of developing a formerly oppressed people to the point where they
can achieve proportionate representation on their own (given equal opportunity) and goes
straight for the proportionate representation…Representation can be manufactured; development
is always hard-earned.”30 Additionally, affirmative action provides a stigma of having received
an undeserved opportunity in the eyes of many white people, one which can create glass ceilings
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above Black employees and students as they are not considered as competent as their white
counterparts.31
Put simply: the Black community is to blame for the social ills it faces, not racial
injustice. They hold themselves back because of the pathologies within Black culture. Black
Americans should spend their time and energy addressing problems within Black culture rather
than blame the dominant group as facilitators of Black inferiority, since the presumption of
Black inferiority rests on the assumption that white supremacy or whiteness as a fundamental
concept are central guidelines for American society. McWhorter believes that this dissertation
and other projects addressing the role of race, racism, or systemic racism in Black American life
are wasted energy: “Obsessing over things that cannot be changed and are not the real problem
anyway is of no use to anyone. Doctoral theses carefully teasing out the role of ‘racism’ in this
phenomenon or that one will seem about as useful to posterity as the scribings of an alchemist.”32
For Black conservatives, the nation is beyond racism because it has gotten to the point where
Black Americans are no longer held back by their race, rendering claims for rectificatory justice
arcane and feckless.

Section 4: Problems with the Black Conservative Position and Black
Rectificatory Justice
While I am unsympathetic to the “Justice Gained” and “Pathological Blackness”
arguments, they deserve to be addressed on their merits regarding rectifying injustice against
Black Americans. Rather than address the litany of problematic issues within the Black
conservative intellectual tradition, as doing so would be outside of the scope of this project, I will
31
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briefly offer a critique of the Black conservative position from Cornel West, then focus on the
connection between Black conservatives and Black rectificatory justice. Specifically, there are
two questions that I will ask with regards to these arguments: first, are affirmative action policies
considered part of rectificatory justice on their framework? Second, are legal changes sufficient
for rectificatory justice for Black Americans?
Cornel West outlined four traditions of Black American thought; exceptionalism
(celebrating the uniqueness of Black culture over and above other cultures), assimilationism
(rejecting an independent Black culture due to deficiencies in Black Americans), marginalism
(Black culture is restrictive and constraining), and humanism (Black culture is to be celebrated as
one of many distinct human cultures).33 Exceptionalism and assimilationism can be understood
in strong and weak terms about the superiority or inferiority of Black Americans, with strong
terms making ontological claims and weak terms making sociological claims.34 Black
conservatives fit squarely in the “Assimilationist” tradition. Specifically, the arguments made in
the prior section are both assimilationist in that they support integrating with mainstream
American culture as a necessary step towards racial improvement; and argue that Black
Americans “stand below other racial groups because of certain values, modes of behavior, or
defects acquired from their endurance of political oppression, social degradation, and economic
exploitation.”35 Noting that this tradition views Black Americans as “morbid subhuman
monsters,” he asserts that critical thinking about the Black experience in America must consider
the assimilationist response as untenable.36
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“Afro-American critical thought must hold the assimilationist response to be
unacceptable. The wholesale renunciation of Afro-American culture only
denigrates Afro-Americans. It deprives them of the autonomous elements of their
way of life, the genuine creations of their cultural heritage…Just as the
exceptionalist tradition looks at Afro-American culture and sees no evil, so the
assimilationist tradition looks and sees no good.”37
West’s critique of this tradition is rather clear, and I agree with him wholeheartedly.
The more important discussions for my project come through engaging the arguments of
Black conservatives, regardless of my sympathy for their position. If, in fact, they have
articulated a conception of rectificatory justice that fits within the framework that I have laid out
throughout this project, then there are significant implications for my project. As such, I will
respond to three important issues about the Black conservative response to claims of Black
rectificatory justice.

4.1: Have Black Americans Already Received Rectificatory Justice?
The first question is if Black Americans have already received a form of rectificatory
justice through the implementation of affirmative action programs. This could be considered
rectificatory because it is responding to the injustice of racial discrimination in hiring and
admission practices by forcing companies and schools to increase the representation of minority
groups across their institutions. McWhorter has admitted that he considers affirmative action to
be a form of reparations, which I take him to consider constitutive of rectificatory justice. 38
Steele’s insistence about the problems of affirmative action for Black Americans suggests that
there is some dispute about whether or not Black conservatives consider affirmative action as a
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rectificatory policy in its present form. There is agreement, however, that the initial goals and
application of affirmative action were rectificatory in that they were responding to (and rightly
so) the entrenched inequality within American society through legal changes. As such, it is not
unreasonable to consider affirmative action policies as a potential form of rectificatory justice for
Black Americans.
The central issues at stake here are both the goals and application of affirmative action
and if they can be considered rectificatory in nature. Recall that rectificatory justice sets an
unjust situation right and requires some combination of an apology, compensation, restoration, or
punishment. Crucially, the measures taken must also be backwards-looking in its rationale and
application – hence the importance of an apology. The apology makes it clear that the wrongdoer
understands that they have committed a wrong and recognizes their victim as their moral equal.
If rectificatory justice can be completed with forward-looking measures, it is not responding to
the specific injustice committed but trying to prevent the same injustice from being repeated in
the future. Preventing injustice is a worthwhile goal, but it is not inherently rectificatory because
preventing future injustice does not necessarily deal with the reality that a specific injustice has
happened and there has not been anything done to resolve the debt of justice. To claim that
affirmative action is constitutive of rectificatory justice is to promote its original reason for
existing, which was to prevent workplace and educational discrimination on the basis of race and
gender, while ignoring that those discriminatory policies were often enacted or supported at
federal levels. It is a policy for diversifying the workforce and recipients of higher education,
which has allowed white women to be the biggest beneficiaries of affirmative action policies.
That makes it difficult to take seriously as satisfying the demands of rectificatory justice, even
though affirmative action is a significant legal development in the pursuit of racial equity.
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That affirmative action is a legal policy that is able to benefit Black Americans but is
itself not rectificatory prompts my second question – are legal changes actually a sufficient
condition for rectificatory justice? This is a sticking point for Black conservatives, since the
importance of the rule of law and protecting the freedoms of the individual stands as firm tenets
of mainstream and Black conservatism. Presumably, to be able to craft legal changes that are
promoting the equality of Black American life, such as the legislation McWhorter mentions, the
social character of the country has to have changed to be able to pressure elected officials into
supporting new policies to improve the conditions of Black life in America. This suggests that
legal changes come as a result of social changes, which would make legal changes both a
necessary and a sufficient condition for Black rectificatory justice. Effectively, the desired social
changes have themselves been manifested in legal protections and the affirmation of the rights of
Black Americans.
This view of legal changes functions as rectificatory justice if the injustice was the
restriction of legal rights or lack of public goods legally afforded to them. To be sure, that is part
of the injustices that Black Americans have endured, such as voter rights oppression and for
many, the public goods and services they were legally owed were nearly unusable.
“Schools in black neighborhoods too often do not teach, sanitation departments do
not protect, employment departments do not find jobs, welfare departments do not
give adequate relief, housing departments do not give decent housing. Most ironic
of all, human rights departments do not guarantee human rights.”39
If systemic racism can continue in the wake of anti-discrimination legislation, then legal changes
(which may well be necessary) are not sufficient for rectifying injustice against Black
Americans. The case that I have made is built on sustained systemic injustice that has continued
39
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after anti-discrimination legislation and is supported by social scientific data which suggests that
implicit and explicit racial bias, racial stereotypes, and accepted racist cultural tropes still play an
important role in the maintenance of racial inequality and racial injustice. Changes in legal
structures to provide an approximation of equality of opportunity are not evidence of changes
regarding how anti-Black injustice is addressed by society, nor are they in themselves enough to
set the unjust situation that Black Americans face right.
For the sake of argument, let us assume that legal changes did prevent the spread of
systemic racism, much in the way that Black conservatives argue. I grant that legal changes are
likely to be necessary in the pursuit of Black rectificatory justice, so considering legal changes a
necessary condition seems reasonable. It is still not clear that legal changes are sufficient for
rectifying injustice for the same reason that affirmative action was not inherently rectificatory –
these laws were designed to prevent future injustices. Moreover, rectificatory justice requires
some combination of restoration, compensation, an apology, and punishment. It is not
necessarily the case that if one is able to provide restoration that one must also provide
compensation. It is necessarily the case that an apology must be rendered. An apology plays a
central role in rectification because it is acknowledgement of the wrong done and to whom it was
done. The wrongdoer must use the components of rectificatory justice as the situation warrants,
but it must include an acknowledgement of the harms the wrongdoer committed as part of what it
takes to set the unjust situation right. Affirmative action policies could be understood as a
measure of compensation by providing preferential treatment to minority groups, including
Black Americans. Civil rights and anti-discrimination legislation could be understood as a
measure of restoration, as these acts protected the legal rights of minority and underprivileged
groups. These legal changes do not include any recognition of responsibility for anti-Black
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injustice. Without these acts being accompanied by the recognition that they are responding to a
specific injustice to Black Americans, it amounts to acting as though the past did not happen in
the service of creating a brighter future. For the victims of injustice, the past plays a direct role in
how they understand the possibilities of the future and ignoring it allows for a perpetrator
ignoring their responsibility in the development of unjust conditions.

Closing Remarks: Can Black Americans Receive Rectificatory Justice?
Although Black conservatives argue that Black Americans have already gained
rectificatory justice, the arguments offered do not appear to stand up to scrutiny of working
within a model of rectificatory justice. Although they latch onto the development of legal
protections and preferential treatment as evidence of a society that has righted itself regarding
systemic racism and anti-Black injustice, social scientific data40 suggests that systemic racism
continues to this day and even when granting their positions, the actions that they take to be
rectificatory fall short of meeting the demands of rectificatory justice. Legal changes are
certainly necessary, but focusing solely on the legal ignores the additional requirements of
rectificatory justice, particularly taking responsibility for the harm caused to Black Americans.
The arguments put forth by Black conservatives do not support the view that Black
Americans have received rectificatory justice, but that actions have been taken to try to prevent
future injustices of the same kind. This does invite a final question for this project – what, if
anything, can be done to improve the social and political conditions of the possibility of Black
rectificatory justice? In the final chapter, I will argue that one pragmatic method is to identify
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certain institutions that play a direct role in how Black Americans are socially recognized and
offer changes in how they represent the Black experience to the public.
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Chapter 5: A Method for Changing How Black Americans Are Socially
Recognized
So far, I have argued that we should use an institutional rights externalist framework to
discuss rectificatory justice for Black Americans and that according to this framework, Black
Americans do not possess a moral right to rectification because of how they are socially
recognized. I have also argued that the arguments provided by Black conservatives (and shared
by many within America) that Black Americans have received rectificatory justice ultimately
conclude that future injustices of the same kind have been prevented. This appears to leave Black
Americans with little recourse to possess the right to rectification, as even with the legal and
social changes that Black conservatives use to support their arguments, there is still the problem
of changing how Black Americans are socially recognized. The goal of this chapter is to offer
one method for changing how Black Americans are socially recognized that works within my
institutional rights externalist framework and helps to generate the sort of social recognition
required for Black Americans to possess a right to rectification. This method focuses on
changing how certain institutions evaluate and interpret the Black American experience, with
two goals in mind: first, provide an accurate interpretation of Black life in the American cultural
narrative; and second, creating a sense of justice within the general American public regarding
the enduring injustice that Black Americans face.
To develop this method, I will first argue that the importance in changing the national
discourse regarding the Black experience is because of the normative effects of how groups are
treated based on the discourse. I will then argue that “victims of enduring injustice” is a
necessary concept for understanding the Black American experience because it is more accurate
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regarding the nature of anti-Black injustice and provides a tangible conceptual reality for
institutions to adopt. I then argue that this method must endeavor to create institutional change in
the conceptual reality regarding Black Americans and aid in developing a sense of justice within
mainstream America towards anti-Black enduring injustice, and offer an explanation of what is
meant by a sense of justice. As a result of the need for a change in both the conceptual reality
about Black Americans and in developing a sense of justice in the public, the method that I
suggest is to identify institutions that are important in how they inform the cultural narrative
about the historical and present condition of Black Americans, then offer pragmatic prescriptions
for changes that can positively impact how Black Americans are socially recognized. Although
this approach could work with many institutions, I will briefly consider the institution of
education because of its dual role as both an authority on information and as a distributor of
information.

Section 1: The Importance of Changing the National Discourse on Black
Americans
My friend’s mother, Eileen,1 works in a rural part of a Midwestern state. She is a Black
woman who works in a largely white female office. She had a conversation once with a white
coworker, Dana, as they were lamenting future financial issues coming in their lives. Dana asked
Eileen if she could offset the financial problems with her “check.” Eileen, confused, asked Dana
what she meant, since she was not old enough to access her Social Security funds. Dana replied
that she thought all Black people received an additional monthly reparations check from the
government, which is why she was baffled that Eileen was expecting future financial difficulties.

1
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Eileen calmly informed Dana that she only receives one paycheck from their employer and that,
as far as she knew, Black people weren’t getting any reparations payments from the government.
Dana was so baffled, she asked another white coworker to hear this revelation from Eileen, that
Black people did not receive reparations.
While anecdotal, Dana’s views should not be dismissed as though they are held by a
small fraction of the population. While perhaps not exactly the same as Dana, the idea that Black
people have already had their unjust situations set right is seemingly part of the American
consciousness. Dana, like many others who share this view, thought that the federal government
of the United States rectified the injustice, whether through monthly reparations payments or by
overestimating the rectificatory ability of federal actions.2 The cultural narrative in American
national dialogue that Black Americans have had their debt of justice paid is one that has a
longstanding history, including then-senatorial candidate Abraham Lincoln arguing that he
considered solely emancipation as righting the wrong done to Black slaves, as they had the right
to enjoy the fruits of their labor but were not social or political equals to white people.3 Changing
the dialogue regarding Black Americans has proven difficult across generations for multiple
reasons, including racist grandparents perpetuating the cultural narrative by passing it down to
their children and grandchildren as fact. A problem for changing the narrative has been the
language available or deployed to describe the specific condition of Black Americans in the
aftermath of chattel slavery.
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1.1: National Discourse and Black Americans
In “Moral Discourse and Slavery” and “Citizenship and Slavery,” Bill Lawson argues
about the importance of the moral and political discourse in America accurately taking into
consideration the experience of Black Americans because of the normative effect of these
discourses on the creation of policy. In doing this, Lawson is making a similar intuitive
connection to the goals of this project: how groups appear within national discourse will inform
the conditions for how those groups and group members are treated.
“The vocabulary of moral/political discourse is important for addressing social
wrongs. If language embodies certain sexist or racist assumptions, these
assumptions will influence our attitudes toward women and racial groups. Words
do not merely refer to our reality, they help define it. If we are concerned with
righting social wrongs, we must examine the language that frames our public
policy.”4
If the discourse is lacking a way to meaningfully discuss the experience of certain groups, such
as women, then how those groups are addressed within public policy will be to the detriment of
those groups. For Lawson, to develop a just social policy, there must be development in the
discourse to be able to account for the “reality of the legacy of inequality that blacks have
experienced due to slavery and its aftermath.”5 Developing this discourse appropriately requires
accepting two things: that Black Americans have argued for their place as equal citizens; and that
without a word or phrase that captures this legacy, we are limited in developing a just social
policy.6
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According to Lawson, much of the debate amongst Black people in America following
Emancipation hinged on determining the best possible course of action given the prevailing antiBlack bias that existed.7 The answers generally split into four directions: emigrating from the
United States; resettling in territories without slaves; developing political power within separate
social institutions; and arguing to improve the American system.8 Although some Black people
were able to leave the United States and emigrate to West Africa and the Caribbean, there has
been no independent Black political state created and attempting to resettle did not prevent Black
people from experiencing racial terrorism following Emancipation. Moral suasion arguments for
improvements to American social and political institutions, however, have been in relatively
consistent use to make claims for better treatment. These arguments, particularly after
Emancipation, have been done through the lens of citizenship. Given the importance of Locke as
a foundation for American liberalism and citizenship, one issue to address is whether Black
people consented to become citizens. Lawson argues that it is apparent that Black people did
consent, as “...we should note that blacks were cognizant of their choices; they chose to accept
citizenship, and they attempted to make their citizenship real.”9 This consent seems apparent
given the development of the Freedmen’s Bureau and its use by Black citizens before its
dismantling. Although the government failed to protect Black citizens shortly after
Emancipation, that failure did not invalidate the citizenship of Black Americans. It made Black
Americans citizens that deserved equal protection of their legal rights. “Locke, and then later
Rawls, realized that persons can be treated unjustly in a liberal democratic state, but neither
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thinks that these unjustly treated individuals lose their membership in the state nor their legal
obligations.”10
Citizenship has been established as important to Black Americans to be able to make
claims about receiving equal treatment under the law. Having the status of citizen does not
adequately encompass the social and political history of those who acquire that status. There is
nothing conveyed by citizen that accurately explains the history of the formerly enslaved. 11 This
history includes long-held general beliefs about the inferiority of Black people; state
governments infringing on the right to vote for Black Americans; and intimidation and violence
to disenfranchise Black people.12 In describing this history, there is a lexical gap in which there
is no generally accepted word or phrase that denotes the legacy of Black subjugation.13 Lacking
that word does not help in the framing of public policy for elevating the social conditions of
Black people in America, on Lawson’s view.
“The lack of a word for accurately describing the situation of blacks has
influenced thinking on affirmative action, compensatory education, busing, and
other programs designed to achieve social justice. With no guiding word for
blacks’ postslavery political and social status, policy makers and social scientists
have described their current condition in one of two ways: either blacks are
described as ‘second-class citizens’ because they are denied the means to make
their citizenship meaningful; or it is argued that the social and political problems
of blacks are no different from those of other groups who have faced hardships
but who are now making their way, if not their fortune. It is clear that blacks are
not slaves, but it is also clear that their holdings and opportunities are not on a par
with typical white Americans, including later immigrants.”14
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Not only has the lack of a word to describe the legacy of Black subjugation affected how
public policy is framed, the attempts to frame Black people as second-class citizens or as
similarly situated to voluntary immigrants to America fail to capture the experience of Black
Americans. Second-class citizen does not directly denote the legacy of Black subjugation in
America, as an alien could be considered a second-class citizen. If Black citizen is used, it
presents an image of Black people in America as at the same social, economic, and political
location as other groups in America without the same legacy of subjugation. Lawson concludes
that the lack of a phrase that denotes the legacy of Black subjugation “is an indication of a lack
of interest Americans have in making the slavery experience a part of our moral deliberations.”15

1.2: Moral Language and National Discourse
Within my modified adaptation of Darbyian institutional rights externalist framework, the
moral deliberations to which Lawson makes reference are the institutional evaluation and
interpretation of the subject of the discourse, Black Americans. The normative effect of not
having a widely accepted term for the conditions of the post-slavery Black American, nor the
moral or political impetus to craft one, is that there is no desire to see justice for Black
Americans as part of the cultural narrative surrounding the Black experience. Having the term
“Confederate” in American national discourse is not just because of the historical fact that the
Confederacy lost the Civil War, but it is also because there is a sense of justice among those
whose families supported the Confederacy or considered the driving issue in the Civil War to be
states’ rights. They are vocal about the importance of their narrative as well as their cultural
symbols and their importance as part of the history of their region and the nation. Part of what
15
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allows them to be heard is having a widely accepted social and political term for the historical
legacy that they support. Although the Confederacy lost a war that fractured the nation, they still
have a proud heritage thriving long after its demise. One could only imagine how uproarious
contemporary Confederate flag and symbol supporters would become if Confederate flags
received similar treatment to Nazi flags and symbols in Germany.
While I am unable to provide a specific term to describe the specific condition of Black
Americans, I do think that concepts can be used to help resolve the problem that Lawson
highlights, one of accurately articulating the condition of Black Americans. The larger claim
being made here is that the language used by institutions, whether social or legal, is part of how
they perform their evaluations and interpretations. Changing the moral language of the country to
include the phrase “sexual harassment” at both a social level and within various policies helped
to change the perception of certain kinds of offensive workplace behavior from acceptable to
unacceptable. This was done because of women being able to collectively identify and label their
own experience. Doing so helped to resolve a hermeneutical injustice, which Miranda Fricker
defines as, “the injustice of having some signiﬁcant area of one’s social experience obscured
from collective understanding owing to a structural identity prejudice in the collective
hermeneutical resource.”16 Being hermeneutically marginalized, or having an unequal
hermeneutical participation in important aspects of social experience, is harmful for those who
are being subordinated or excluded.17 This kind of marginalization, which is a hermeneutical
injustice, can work at purely structural levels. When she means structural, she explicitly says that
“there may be no social agent (individual or institutional) identifiable as responsible for the
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marginalization.”18 Although she and I differ on the use of structural, as I would consider
institutions that can provide institutional respect as identifiable social agents, her larger point is
that this can and does occur at a much greater level than merely individuals and can be
perpetuated by social structures. However, as Kristie Dotson notes, resolving injustices of this
kind requires a “change or alteration in the socioepistemic structures.”19 More succinctly, she
says: “To address hermeneutical injustices, one must seek out the socioepistemic conditions that
foster hermeneutical injustice.”20 Dotson advances on Fricker’s work by highlighting a different
form of hermeneutical injustice – contributory injustice. This occurs when an epistemic agent’s
privileged position and their use of structurally prejudiced hermeneutical resources leads to the
epistemic harm of a knower.21 Effectively, someone who has knowledge of their own experience
will have the articulations of their experience receive less support than they should because of
biases within the hermeneutical resources of the perceiver.22 Responding to this set of conditions
requires perceivers to have a broader awareness of differing hermeneutical resources available.
Considering that some institutions offer interpretations and evaluations, they seem like entities
that could be considered Dotsonian “perceivers.” Perhaps what can help change their perception
is broadening their hermeneutical resources by providing new moral language regarding the
experience of Black Americans.
The importance of shaping the historical and contemporary legacy of Black people is not
lost on other sections of the African diaspora. The response by African scholars to the Lawson
problem of accurate description of the Black experience, with respect to the theft of Africans and
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the unimaginable atrocities committed in the aftermath of that theft, has been to develop an
Afrocentric term rather than rely on Eurocentric terms such as holocaust that do not evoke
imagery that is specific to the Black experience. Dotson suggested that hermeneutically
marginalized communities have their own resources worth listening to, and that assuming that
we all share the same hermeneutical resources “fails to take into account alternate
epistemologies, countermythologies, and hidden transcripts that exist in hermeneutically
marginalized communities among themselves.”23 Marimba Ani develops the word “maafa,” a
Swahili term that she translates to disaster.24 This captures part of the essence of the horrors of
slavery but does not include intent, as disasters include natural disasters or acts of God. There is
no culpability for disasters because they lack intent. Mulana Karenga bridges this gap with the
word “maangamizi,” a Swahili word that translates to destruction.25
“An act of destruction is the work of a destroyer. It may constitute an actus reus, a
guilty deed or wrongful activity that transgresses ethics and law. A case for
reparations that evokes a mass destruction is far more persuasive than one that
establishes a disaster. A case merely alleging a terrible disaster might even fail to
state a cause of action.”26
The focus by African scholars on the intentionality and brutality in the concept of destruction
offers insight into how to best recognize concepts available within the American context to
describe the condition of Black Americans. Chancellor Williams’ work featured the concept of
destruction as central to understanding the Black experience across the diaspora and across
history, connecting destruction as a concept to the fall of classical African civilizations to the
current state of Black people following slavery. Weldon Williams sums the importance of
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Chancellor Williams’ work, saying: “By organizing the writing of black history this way, he
enabled us to perceive the continuity of destruction from the sunset of black antiquity to the
present moment.”27 The continuity of destruction that he develops is a notion that could be useful
for deploying within the Black American context, provided there is an applicable moral or
political concept that ties itself the diachronic nature of anti-Black injustice.

Section 2: Enduring Injustice, Cultural Narratives, and a Sense of Justice
The notion of a continuity of destruction is a way of connecting the historic and
contemporary injustices against Black Americans. As I mentioned in Chapter 1, I consider antiBlack injustice as both ongoing and fundamental to any interpretation of the Black experience in
America. Explaining this continuity in moral terms will provide a fundamental concept for
evaluating and interpreting Black life that can be a guiding principle for what institutional
changes need to be made. A concept that I endorse as able to do so is “victims of enduring
injustice” as an interpretive framework for Black Americans.
I endorse the model of enduring injustice by Jeff Spinner-Halev, one which he
acknowledges is designed to “help the advocates of repairing historical injustice respond to the
criticisms of the skeptics by reframing the issue at hand,”28 and offer a brief recapitulation here.
Rather than focusing on historical injustices needing to be rectified, Spinner-Halev’s model
considers how historical injustices persist over time, a conceptual change that requires a different
model from historical injustice. “Enduring injustice has roots in the past and continues to the
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present day; an enduring injustice endures over time and often over space as well.”29 As such, it
must have both a historic and contemporary component. Some historical injustices have been
eliminated, whereas others, like those that Black Americans face, have not. Spinner-Halev is
clear about the time constraint to enduring injustice, as it must progress through generations for
that group for the injustice to be enduring. “Not only do indigenous people and AfricanAmericans currently endure injustice, but also this injustice has lasted over time.”30 He makes a
distinction between enduring injustice and enduring harm, noting that the latter arises when “a
group is not living under conditions of injustice but the historic injustice haunts the group, as it is
not properly acknowledged or memorialized.”31 By conditions of injustice, he refers to the
existence of injustice that is specific to a particular group, often in the form of rights violations
and denials. Not all enduring harms are themselves enduring injustices, but enduring injustices
often include the experience of enduring harms.
He argues that injustices of this form exist because they have not been remedied, as he
considers the demands for rectification in these instances to often fall beyond the scope of
traditional liberal forms of justice, echoing the problems with viewing policies like affirmative
action as rectificatory that I mentioned in Chapter 4.
“What unites most cases of enduring injustice, however, is a failure of liberalism.
The injustice from the past has not been remedied; it continues today in some
form, and it seems that without a change in policies, it will continue into the
future. A better defense of individual rights, and a modest or moderate
redistribution of wealth, will often not solve the enduring injustice (though
sometimes these things will help). At best, the liberal solution to the injustice will
only partly alleviate the injustice, while sometimes liberal justice will not speak at
all to the injustice. When injustices endure, it is often because they lie beyond the
29
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bounds of liberal theory: if the solution to these injustices was a matter of simply
applying liberal justice, there would be fewer enduring injustices today.”32
He notes the importance of cultural memory and cultural narrative as part of how enduring
injustice exists. In order to rectify enduring injustice, there must be a clear acknowledgement of
the injustice and the role the nation played in the extended time of injustice. He argues that
building a better future requires taking the collective memory of the past.
“People do not live absent a context; they are storytelling and story-living
animals. Collective memories are important because our identities, individual and
collective, are shaped through memory…Belonging to a group situates people in
the world. It gives a point of reference and a point of pride for group members. It
helps to tell group members who they are and who they are not. People belong to
many groups, as liberals often point out. Intergenerational groups are particularly
important, however, when it comes to enduring injustice; national, ethnic, racial,
and religious groups all fit the bill. These are groups that often continue through
time, that pass down stories, memories and cultural practices, traditions, and
symbols from one generation to the next…much of human behavior cannot be
made sense of without taking collective memory into account.”33
Ultimately, injustices endure when a cultural narrative “is broken and is not rebuilt, repaired, or
forgotten, or when collective memory understandably leads to a deep mistrust of the
government.”34 To resolve this problem requires acknowledging the history of the injustice
towards “victims of enduring injustice,” and purposefully acting to show that they are not the
same as prior institutions. “What Black Americans rightly want are signs from the government
that it is no longer committed to the racist policies of the past; one way to do this is to show a
break with previous governments, though other ways are needed as well.”35 Doing so necessarily
changes the cultural narrative surrounding the Black American experience.
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2.1: Cultural Narratives and Enduring Injustice
As the anecdote above demonstrated, there is a general cultural narrative within the
national dialogue that Black Americans have already gained rectificatory justice. It may help
explain why there has been and continues to be tremendous opposition to reparations for slavery
and Jim Crow, as a 2014 YouGov/HuffPost poll revealed. “Opposition to reparations for the
descendants of slaves is overwhelming, with 68% of the public against it and only 15% in favor.
Asked in a separate survey whether the slaves themselves should have received compensation
after the Civil War, 37% of the American public said yes but 31% said no.”36 What was even
more striking was the narrow opposition to reparations to interned Japanese-Americans and the
sole instance of majority support for cash reparations came for Germany's payments to survivors
of the Holocaust. This suggests that there is a general lack of a sense of justice by the majority of
Americans for the horrors they have committed against their own, and a significant sense of
justice for the horrors they have not only witnessed, but also fought to stop. The downplaying of
American injustices and the valorization of American morals is part of the national dialogue and
the cultural narrative surrounding America.
It is unsurprising that the accepted cultural narrative of America and racism is that it
overcame its racist history through the work of legendary figures like Martin Luther King Jr. and
Rosa Parks, culminating in the end of legal discrimination and yielding events like the election of
President Obama. It reinforces that America accomplished a morally laudable victory, defeating
the threat of its own racism. Spinner-Halev furthers this point, saying:
“Many nations have narratives of victimhood; they see their history in terms of
threats that they have bravely fought off, or the long suffering they have endured.
36
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Children are frequently taught to be proud of the way their nation has handled
adversity, making a narrative of abuse and massacre of others hard to swallow.
Changing the understanding of one’s nation does not mean just inserting a
paragraph in a history book; to accept the ignored history of abuse means that
one’s national pride must be nuanced with its points of shame…Part of what is at
stake in collective memory is the reminder to us all of the horrors that have taken
place in the past, to perhaps prevent them from taking place again (though the
effectiveness of this is another matter). If many people could be convinced that
the Armenians did not die in a genocide, and that many other atrocities didn’t take
place, then governments could do the same thing time and again.”37
Using “victims of enduring injustice” as a central concept for describing the Black
experience recognizes the importance of cultural narratives as part of how injustice and its
effects persist across generations. This makes it a preferable lens for viewing anti-Black injustice
because it takes into account both the value of certain cultural narratives while also
acknowledging that these narratives are themselves partial accounts that have normative effects,
much in the way Lawson suggested there are normative effects to how one is part of the national
cultural narrative. Viewing anti-Black injustice through a lens of enduring injustice interrupts the
current narrative at two levels: it is contradictory to the narrative in its description of Black life
in America; and it is contradictory to the implicit claim within the narrative that Black
Americans have gained rectificatory justice. For enduring injustice to exist in any space, the
relevant set of injustices that have continued and become enduring injustices cannot have been
rectified. And as I argued in Chapter 4, actions that are often understood as rectificatory are not
actually rectificatory.
What “victims of enduring injustice” provides for the development of a method of
institutional change is offer a moral and political reality for institutions to acknowledge as real. If
this goal is accomplished, these institutions have accepted the arguments offered by activists,
37
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advocates, and allies that anti-Black injustice never ended with legal changes. Changes in
leadership, social and political pressure, or institutional views evolving over time are examples
of ways this sort of change could occur. Accepting these arguments, however that is
accomplished, fundamentally changes the cultural narrative that these institutions propagate.
Australia’s annual National Sorry Day and its government’s 2008 formal apology to the
indigenous people of Australia for the injustices they endured are examples of concrete steps that
fundamentally changed the cultural narrative regarding the experience of indigenous Australians.
The existence of an annual day of remembrance means that the reality that the nation participated
in brutality has to become part of how the experience of indigenous Australians is addressed and
acknowledged.
Having institutions in America acknowledge the reality of enduring injustice for Black
Americans has the potential to change the cultural narrative regarding the experience of Black
Americans. As such, I take this concept to be at least one of the fundamental concepts for
describing the Black experience in America because it is a more accurate description of that
experience and offers a moral reality for institutions to acknowledge as real.

2.3: A Sense of Justice
The second requirement for this method is that it must aid in developing a social desire to
address anti-Black injustice. I describe this social desire as a sense of justice and take my view
on it from the work of Rodney Roberts. He describes it as possessing a basic sense of right and
wrong, both for the distribution of rights and duties but also for when the distributive system has
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broken down.38 It also gives one a moral impetus to action, to seek justice regardless of whether
it is for oneself or for others. Roberts sums this view up by saying, “So when a person has a
sense of justice, we can say that person (1) gives consideration to claims in justice, both
distributive and rectificatory, and (2) is generally moved to just action when faced with sound
reasoning in support of such a claim.”39 This movement to action includes feeling the anger of
being denied our due, and feeling empathy for injustice that others experience. Roberts provides
an additional strong version of the sense of justice, with one who has a strong sense of justice
being someone who:
“(1) gives serious, thoughtful consideration to claims in justice, both distributive
and rectificatory, and (2) has a sense of urgency with respect to seeing justice
done and is almost always moved to just action when faced with sound reasoning
in support of any such claim, even when fulfilling a particular claim entails
enormous loss to oneself or to a group to which one belongs. Persons having a
strong sense of justice are almost always prone to act justly.”40
The difference between someone who lacks a sense of justice, someone who has a sense of
justice, and someone who has a strong sense of justice can be understood through the example of
the murder of Kitty Genovese. During her prolonged, brutal murder in public, many neighbors
opted not to call the police or intervene. These would be people who lacked a sense of justice.
Although the popular story regarding Ms. Genovese’s murder is that nobody tried to help her, a
few neighbors did call 911 to alert them about an ongoing event. These would be people who had
a sense of justice. Imagine if someone chose to intervene and try to prevent Ms. Genovese’s
murder. That person, who would have been risking their own life, would have exemplified
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having a strong sense of justice. A life or death scenario is not a requirement for having a strong
sense of justice, but is useful in highlighting the relevant distinctions.
Roberts considers the lack of a strong sense of justice as the limiting factor for rectifying
anti-Black injustice. “The lack of a strong sense of a justice helps to explain why rectificatory
efforts in favor of African Americans continue to be constrained in the face of rectificatory
efforts in favor of the Japanese-American World War II internees.”41 His approach has merit, as
it highlights the need for just action in order to resolve matters of injustice. It also provides an
ideal concept for people to aim at – the development of a strong sense of justice. Roberts does
not offer reasons for possessing or dispossessing a strong sense of justice, but my social
recognition-based analysis regarding rectificatory justice for Black Americans offers a reason for
the lack of a strong sense of justice towards anti-Black injustice. How Black Americans are
socially recognized erodes mainstream America’s desire to intercede to end anti-Black injustice.
American cultural narratives recognize the plight of Black Americans, but the responsibility for
the existence of that plight is often an unspoken or forgotten part of the narrative. Without a
sense that anti-Black injustice is a problem that seems to manifest itself across institutions and at
nearly all levels of society, it makes sense that mainstream America does not possess a strong
sense of justice about anti-Black injustice. Not only is there not a significant enough problem to
address, the onus has been forced on Black Americans to change their conditions. Whenever
arguments about the state of Black Americans utilize comparisons to other non-Black racial,
ethnic, and immigrant groups, an underlying premise is, “these groups also had it bad and
overcame it, so why can’t you?” The premise ignores how other immigrant groups were not
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originally considered legal property, an original position that is unlike any other non-Black
racial, ethnic, or immigrant group often compared with Black Americans.
The results of this section make clear two goals any method for institutional change must
have. First, it must endeavor to change the institutional interpretation and evaluation of Black
Americans from one that understands anti-Black injustice as a relic of the past to recognizing it
as an ongoing phenomenon. It must also provoke a response to enduring injustice by developing
a strong sense of justice regarding anti-Black injustice. In the following section, I identify an
institution that could be the subject of this method.

Section 3: Changing the Institution of Education
When considering why institutions might be a desired target for the purposes of this
project, it is important to remember how Darby described what some institutions are able to do:
they are like a baseball umpire who can determine a pitch to be either a ball or a strike. A pitch is
analogous to a cultural behavior, as they both have no inherent value to the institution or the
umpire. What umpires and some institutions are able to do is authoritatively offer a value
judgment about the action. If the umpire deems the pitch not to have satisfied his demands, he
casts a negative judgment and proclaims for the participants that it is a ball. If the pitch satisfied
his demands, he offers a positive judgment and proclaims that it is a strike. Institutional
interpretations of cultural behavior fall into similar patterns as the umpire. Institutions that have
that level of inculcating power should be considered as possible candidates to target for change
because of their authoritative ability to determine the content of the cultural narrative of
America. Some institutions do not just guide cultural narratives; some are able to play a dual role
of authority and publicist of American cultural narratives. This dual role means that if that
132

institution is able to be changed, the content of the cultural narrative about Black Americans is
changed, and an authoritative institution is also inculcating the masses with a changed cultural
narrative.
Certainly, the legal arena is an institution that has significant inculcating ability, as many
students in introduction to ethics courses often believe that legality presupposes morality while
forgetting that many of the most heinous atrocities in recent human history were considered legal
and sanctioned by the government. Popular culture, including news media, music, television, and
the recent addition of social media in the digital age, has perhaps more inculcating power than it
ever did with regards to both questioning and establishing the veracity of differing cultural
narratives about how life is for various groups of people in America. I think in a future version of
this project, those institutions could come under scrutiny of how they could change in the service
of improving how Black Americans are socially recognized. Given what I have mentioned about
the potential of changing a dual role institution, I will focus my attention on the institution of
education in the following section.

3.1: Education as a Primary Institution to Change
Within the American liberal paradigm, there is at least one institution that affects the vast
majority of its citizens – education. Education is an institution that inculcates values to its
participants. Children are taught early about how to behave, stand in line, take turns, share, and
even recite the Pledge of Allegiance in their early school days. Additional civic virtues are taught
as valuable to students, such as mutual respect for other ways of life, fairness, and tolerance.
Besides transmitting behavioral and civic values that are central to being a member of society,
education transmits information that it purports to be accurate. School teaches many students
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how they should behave in the world and what is assumed to be universally accepted pieces of
information. Granted with the power to offer information to its participants and a requirement
that children attend school until the age of 16, education is a uniquely located institution at the
intersection of value distribution and knowledge distribution.
Education, as an institution, has a goal of teaching the value of mutual respect for
different ways of life.42 This means that it determines, by way of choosing how to tell the
cultural narrative and demonstrate certain cultural values to its constituents, which ways of life
are deserving of respect. In that way, it functions like an umpire,43 both in how it authorizes how
Black children should be treated compared to non-Black children, as well as authoritatively
providing the accuracy within the cultural narrative about the Black experience in America for
the overwhelming majority of Americans that are informed by the institution of education
throughout their youth. Take the example of Black children being punished for wearing their hair
natural in schools and school-sanctioned athletic competitions. That appears to be a negative
value judgment about a Black cultural practice that has real world consequences for those who
observe the negative value judgment as well as are the recipients of that judgment. Their
authoritative position with regard to the accuracy of a cultural narrative allowed children’s
textbooks to be printed and shipped that referred to slaves as immigrant workers. The
information from that textbook was purported to be true, when it omits significant details about
chattel slavery. Considering the unfortunate racial bias that exists in schools, from leadership to
the teachers and staff, education performs an additional role of reifying the cultural narrative
through its treatment of Black students as well as its depiction of Black life in America. This
makes it an even more important institution to target, as its inculcating role for both treatment
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and description can be used in the service of changing how Black Americans are socially
recognized, a form of social recognition that can then be reified by the institution.
I would only briefly gesture at how these changes could look, although any prescriptions
must take care to promote Black Americans as “victims of enduring injustice” and strive to
promote a sense of justice regarding that enduring injustice. My position is that the basis for
these changes could be inspired by these three sources: the environment and methodology of
Historically Black Colleges and Universities (HBCUs); culturally responsive pedagogy; and
precollege philosophy being a mandatory addition to education. The conjunction of these three
educational approaches aims to create critically thinking people with a sense of justice.

3.2: Three Ways of Changing the Cultural Narrative by Changing
Education
HBCUs inculcate the kinds of values and information with the goal of providing its
students a more accurate version of the cultural, economic, and political information about Black
Americans. They have demonstrated a twofold shift in the educational environment compared to
mainstream American education: to appropriately valorize what accomplishments and successes
Black Americans have had; and train a critical eye to help students recognize and combat the
societal ills they were all too familiar with prior to attending. Filtering the educational
environment through the lens of the Black experience allows students to gain a rich history and
unique insights about how Black Americans survived racial terrorism and how they can survive
colorblind racism today. That includes the promotion of the positive aspects of the Black
experience as well as disputing the cultural narrative surrounding Black people. It should be
noted that there have been many non-Black attendees and graduates of HBCUs, so while the
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educational environment has not been designed with non-Black students specifically in mind,
they can be inculcated with values that promote a full view of the Black American experience,
which includes their condition as victims of enduring injustice as well as valorizing the
contributions made by Black Americans as a normal part of the American national dialogue so
that Black history actually becomes American history. If HBCUs can pull this feat off in the
current climate, they should be looked to as a pillar for how to change the institution of education
in the service of changing how Black Americans are socially recognized.
The HBCU model of education can be implemented throughout mainstream educational
institutions is possible through a change in the content being taught as well as the pedagogical
methods being utilized. Regarding content, educational institutions would need to make Black
contributions to societies, including the formation and destruction of their own societies across
history, a central part to the content of general education at all levels. The Black-centered model
of HBCUs is one that endeavors to provide two things: an accurate historical context for the
Black experience in America; and remind students of the potential of Black people in America as
limitless despite that historical context.
Providing an accurate historical context for the Black experience in America (and
globally) would serve to change the perception of Black people from passive agents in history to
active agents in history, complete with a diversity of experiences, approaches, and cultures.
Pedagogically, teachers at all levels should be proactive in reminding students that Black
Americans have limitless potential. One way that this is possible is by changing how Black
students are treated in the classroom, as they are currently treated with expectations of
underperformance and needing punishment. Educational institutions will have to become more
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supportive environments. They must become places that pride themselves on seeing all of its
students achieve at the highest levels as a part of its adoption of the HBCU model.
Critical pedagogy was made famous by Paulo Freire in his work that uncovered the
relationship between student and teacher needed to be shifted in order to better reach students.44
Rather than considering students a receptacle for knowledge, he takes a view that education is
dialogical between teacher and student. The student needs to be able to critically engage the
material she is being taught rather than accept things as they are. What this means as an
instructor is being able to meet students where they are in a holistic manner, including their
racial background. An aspect of critically responsive pedagogy is working to prevent implicit
and explicit bias from entering the classroom by centering the students and their lived
experiences as part of the classroom. This approach to educating offers the space for Black and
non-Black students to gain valuable alternative perspectives to the Black experience while
leaving the space for students to engage with how race (and other ethnic, gender, and
sociocultural identities) affects their day to day lived experiences. Critical pedagogy has a goal
of helping students develop a critical eye towards their society.
Doing philosophy with children has received more statistical support in recent years that
it assists in moral development of children.45 As a discipline, philosophy develops critical
thinking and reasoning, problem solving skills, communication skills as well as creative
thinking. We traditionally wait until college for people to be exposed to philosophy; in the
service of producing a post-racist society, it behooves us to give our students as many intellectual
tools as possible for them to better grapple with and understand the new valorization of the Black
44
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experience in America. Improving the critical thinking abilities of the citizenry through an early
and often exposure to philosophy is one potential avenue for developing the second condition of
a sense of justice: being moved to just action when offered sound reasoning. Many disciplines
develop critical thinking skills, but I take it to be uncontroversial to claim that philosophy is one
of the best at doing so. Although there are a number of different approaches to doing precollege
philosophy, including outside of the classroom context, the wide range of approaches center the
student and the student’s perspective as valuable while providing philosophical tools to help
students interrogate and learn to justify their worldviews.46
By using these three frameworks in unison, education takes a direct approach to changing
the cultural narrative about Black Americans. By being more accurate about the Black
experience at all levels of education; considering the Black experience as relevant to the
educational experience; and developing philosophical skills of clarity of communication and
moral reasoning, education would play a very different role in how it authoritatively describes
the Black experience in America. The hope is that this change is able to help future generations
of Black Americans have a change in how they are socially recognized and possibly gain a right
to rectification because of a more profound sense of justice about this issue within society.

Section 4: Responding to Derrick Bell
This position must address the criticisms of Derrick Bell, who challenges the idea that
changing what is known changes what is done. Bell argues that racial realism exists, which is
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that racism is so deeply embedded in the country that it will not ever leave.47 His short story,
“Racism’s Secret Bonding,” outlines his belief regarding education being a method of addressing
racial injustice. With the creation of a device that alters the weather and transmits facts about the
plight of Black Americans to all Americans, accurate statistical data as well as historic lectures
and speeches such as Frederick Douglass’ Fourth of July address, eventually the government
bent to citizens desires to do something to stop the Data Storms, designing programs for racial
uplift.
This turned out to be a parable from Geneva, the story’s main character. She was giving
her prediction for how mainstream America would react if those Data Storms were to happen.
Geneva’s interlocutor (presumably a stand-in for Bell) ultimately did not think that this would be
the case. Even with a method of guaranteeing that white Americans cannot claim ignorance
about the plight of Black Americans, he argued that the dominant group becoming meaningfully
aware of Black injustice is not sufficient to modify dominant group racial attitudes.48
“Even older and wiser, it’s hard for me to admit, but we fool ourselves when we
argue that whites do not know what racial subordination does to its victims. Oh,
they may not know the details of the harm, or its scope, but they know. Knowing
is the key to racism’s greatest value to individual whites and to their interest in
maintaining the racial status quo.”49
Geneva eventually agrees with him, noting that there is an unspoken bond between white
Americans that makes it difficult to see how a shift in information will be enough to shift actions.
“Geneva sat quietly for a time, absorbed in thought. ‘A fine story,’ she said
finally, ‘and an apt metaphor for the knowing but unspoken alliance whereby all
whites are bonded – as bell hooks says – by racism. And,’ she added, ‘as
47
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paradoxical as it seems, viewing racism as an amalgam of guilt, responsibility,
and power – all of which are generally known but never acknowledged – may
explain why educational programs are destined to fail. More important, the onus
of this open but unmentionable secret about racism marks the critical difference
between blacks and whites in this country, the unbreachable barrier, the essence
of why blacks can never be deemed the orthodox, the standard, the conventional.
Indeed, the fact that, as victims, we suffer racism’s harm but, as a people, cannot
share the responsibility for that harm, may be the crucial component in a
definition of what it is to be black in America.”50
I take Bell’s point to be accurate. Being aware that a problem exists is not enough to spur one to
action. One must also feel the moral force of the problem and feel compelled to respond. My
position differs from Bell in that there is a dual emphasis on the development of the moral force
of the problem in my method. Rather than relying on increased awareness about anti-Black
injustice, my method also includes a valorization of Black contributions to American society. It
also recognizes that any meaningful, long lasting change will not come from information alone
but from being moved to pursue just action. Fostering a strong sense of justice in conjunction
with providing consistently accurate information regarding the existence of anti-Black injustice
is a different approach than dropping facts about Black life on mainstream America.
Currently, mainstream America has an implicit understanding that Black life is not a form
of an ideal American life. Jane Elliott, the anti-racist educator, once held a forum and asked if
any white people in the audience would stand up if they would accept the same treatment that
society gives to Black people. Nobody stood up, after which she remarked, “That says very
plainly that you know what’s happening, you know you don’t want it for you. I want to know
why you’re so willing to accept it or allow it to happen for others.”51 Her remarks support my
view that a lack of awareness is not the sole problem. The lack of a strong sense of justice
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accompanying awareness of anti-Black injustice is an additional, perhaps greater problem. This
problem highlights the pragmatic difference between wanting the public to be aware of antiBlack injustice and wanting the public to develop a sense of justice about anti-Black injustice.
Addressing injustice requires a call to change behavior that is inspired by possessing a strong
sense of justice.
My position is that the existence of racial realism does not end the struggle to improve
the material conditions of Black Americans. It does mean that the struggle must be pragmatic,
insofar as the goals of that struggle are to produce tangible gains where possible.52 The method
that I am endorsing is one potential strategy given the framework that I have laid out, but it is not
the only possible strategy that could work within that framework. For example, education is not
the only institution that could be addressed – popular media (e.g., movies, television shows, and
music), news media, and social media have significant power in their ability to inculcate
mainstream America and could be considered better targets for change. I do think that regardless
of the institution chosen, changing it will require that institution doing two things: connecting the
enduring nature of anti-Black injustice to the cultural narrative about America; and valorizing
Black accomplishments as an additional part of that narrative.
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Conclusion
During the early parts of the 2020 Democratic primary season, a number of candidates
were asked about their position on reparations for Black Americans. I will admit I was surprised
to see this question become such an important topic in the primary season, but I was more
curious to see how the candidates would respond. Mayor Juaquin Castro and Senators Kamala
Harris, Amy Klobuchar, and Bernie Sanders are among the various candidates who have been
asked if they would support reparations. Castro and Harris have publicly stated their support for
reparations. Klobuchar said she did not support reparations. Sanders offered the most interesting
response, wondering what his competitors meant by reparations before endorsing a program to
uplift all distressed communities across America. It may or may not be the right political
response, but Sanders was asking the right philosophical question about what is meant by
reparations.
One goal for my project was to provide a context for understanding what is meant by
reparations while also highlighting that the broader goal is rectificatory justice. My fear is that
discussions about reparations without including about other aspects to rectificatory justice, such
as requiring a just apology, creates the potential for reparations without actual repair being done
to the relationship. A focus on reparations and compensation misses the larger component of
rectification – acknowledging and accepting responsibility for the injustice committed. A check
with an “I’m Sorry” card in the mail would not suffice.
The major goal for my project was to answer why there has been such staunch resistance
to rectifying anti-Black injustice, regardless of the manner of proposal. My analysis is that how
Black Americans are socially recognized ultimately erodes their ability to possess the right to
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rectification required to rectify anti-Black injustice. Part of this social recognition includes a
notion that Black Americans have already received rectificatory justice through antidiscrimination legislation and programs like affirmative action. Although those actions appear to
be rectificatory, they do not meet the standards of rectificatory justice. This is partly because
those actions did not include taking responsibility for creating the conditions of injustice,
preferring to focus on preventing future versions of similar forms of injustice. Since Black
Americans have not received rectificatory justice but are making morally justified demands,
what is required for them to possess a right to rectification is a change in how they are socially
recognized. I have endorsed the institution of education as a primary institution to change
because of its inculcating power, but it is far from the only one. Entertainment and popular
media, news media, and law enforcement are other institutions that possess significant power in
mapping the direction of the cultural narrative about Black Americans.
I think the usefulness of the overall framework of moral rights possession that I’ve
endorsed is that it can be applied to develop a pragmatic understanding of why certain kinds of
unjust treatment continues and ways to identify institutions that can be attacked in order to
rectify that injustice. Where legal rights possession was the issue, the civil rights era pushed
pragmatically to ensure legal status for Black Americans. The issue of rectifying anti-Black
injustice, however, begins with possession of the right to rectification being institutionally
respected. On my view, pragmatic approaches to changing the relevant social conditions include
changing how institutions evaluate and interpret Black American life.
More broadly, I think this view can be used to examine various types of injustices
committed both against and within oppressed groups. This would include issues such as: the
marginalization of LBGTQ people across the racial and socioeconomic spectrum, how the
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elderly and disabled are treated as throwaway people; the poor and homeless seen as disposable
problems; navigating the attribution of moral rights within various racial and socioeconomic
groups and how those differences manifest; and that it can be used as a way to analyze how past
injustices have been rectified, such as the example of Japanese American internment. My overall
goal is to provide oppressed people with another pragmatic way to identify and respond to their
oppression by locating the institutions that evaluate and interpret them. I admit I doubt I will see
the relevant changes in society for Black Americans to gain rectificatory justice in my lifetime,
but I do believe that agitating for these changes can help Black people who are here and Black
people to come receive the treatment they deserve.
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